Ft Environmental
act Statement On
Agreement Between
United States and Canada
East Coast Fishery Resources

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APRIL 1980

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DOCUMENT

COLLECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

ON THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

ON EAST COAST FISHERY RESOURCES

APRIL 1980

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Cover Sheet

(a) Responsible agencies: U.S. Department of State (lead)
and U.S. Department of Commerce.

(b) Proposed action: Ratification and implementation of the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of Canada on East Coast
Fishery Resources. This action will impact the U.S.
fishery conservation zone in the Gulf of Maine and
Georges Bank area.

(c) For further information contact:

Mr. William H. Mansfield, III
Office of Environment & Health
Room 7820

Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
(202)632-9266

(d) Statement type: Draft Environmental Impact Statement.

(e) Abstract: This statement evaluates the environmental
impact of ratifying and implementing the Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Canada on East Coast Fishery
Resources. The Agreement establishes a management
framework that has the potential to assure the long-
term productivity of the fishery resources of the
Georges Bank - Gulf of Maine area with little or no
adverse economic impact to the users of the resource.

(f) Dates: Comments must be received by .

XI

Summary

This statement analyzes the environmental impact of
ratifying and implementing the Agreement between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of
Canada on East Coast Fishery Resources, signed March 29,
1979. This bilateral fisheries agreement creates a frame-
work that would enable the countries to coordinate fishery
management decisions for stocks of mutual interest. The
Agreement itself makes few management decisions regarding
these resources. It requires that total allowable catches
(TAC's) be established annually based on the best scienti-
fic information available. It vests the United States,
Canada, or both countries with exclusive or primary
management responsibility for each stock covered. It also
establishes the shares of the TAC's to be caught by each
country and provides for access by fishermen of each
country to the fishery zone of the other, enabling
fishermen of both to continue traditional fisheries.

Beyond these basic provisions, the Agreement leaves
the development of specific management programs to the
country with exclusive or primary management responsibility
or to both countries in the case of four stocks. These
programs would be developed in accordance with the Agree-
ment's management principles which are patterned on the

Ill

national standards for fishery management contained in the
Fishery Conse*" vation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA). In
the case of stocks managed primarily by one country and
those managed jointly, the Agreement provides for dispute
resolution to guard against the possibility that deadlock
may leave the stocks unprotected.

The need for the proposed action stems from the
decision by both countries in 1976 to extend their
jurisdiction over fisheries to 200 miles and to undertake
national programs of fishery management within these
extended areas. Because a number of important fish stocks
migrate between areas they can be affected by fishing
pressure applied in either country's zone. For this
reason, U.S. and Canadian authorities perceived the need
to coordinate fishery management decisions for such stocks.

Furthermore, the limits of the extended zones claimed
by the United States and Canada overlap in four areas. The
most pronounced overlap occurs in the Atlantic on the
northeastern third of Georges Bank, one of the world's
richest fishing grounds and traditionally one of
significant importance to U.S. fishermen. In the absence of
an established maritime boundary, fish stocks in this area
are particularly prone to the risks of competitive
overfishing .

IV

The United States and Canada began discussions in
1976 aimed at creating a framework for coordinated
fishery management. In August 1977 both governments
appointed special negotiators. Ey October 1977 the coun-
tries had agreed on the basic elements and principles of
such a framework. On March 29, 1979, the United States
and Canada signed the agreement subsequently negotiated.

While negotiations were underway, both governments
entered into a reciprocal fishery agreement for 1977 that
continued traditional fisheries at recent levels. By the
end of that year, when it became clear that more time would
be needed to work out the long term arrangements, both
governments agreed to extend the 1977 agreement with minor
modifications for another year. In June 1978, however,
Canada announced that it would not give effect to the 1978
interim agreement and suspended traditional U.S. fisheries
in its undisputed fishery zone. The United States took
reciprocal action. Since that time, fishermen of each
country have been excluded from the undisputed zone of the
other, although fishermen of both continue to operate in
the disputed area on Georges Bank subject only to their
respective domestic regulations.

The Agreement would reduce current risks of competi-
tive overfishing of stocks in the Georges Bank disputed

zone and of stocks that range between the undisputed zones
of the United States and" Canada by assuring that the
fishing activity of both countries for stocks to which both
have access would be taken into account in managing these
resources .

Management Framework

The Agreement establishes a bilateral East Coast
Fisheries Commission to serve as a forum for coordinating
fishery management decisions. Stocks are divided into
three categories that provide for graduated degrees of
interaction between the countries.

Where possible, to facilitate management and to avoid
the potential for disagreement over conservation goals,
stocks would be managed exclusively or primarily by one
country or the other. Thus, stocks listed in Category C
would be managed exclusively by the United States or Canada
The managing country would be required only to consult with
the other before implementing management measures. Stocks
listed in Category B would be managed primarily by one
country or the other. The country with primary management
responsibility would d'evelop management measures for these
stocks that would enter into force regardless of an objec-
tion by the other country. For them to be modified, the

VI

other country would have to demonstrate that they are
"clearly inconsistent" with the Agreement's broad manage-
ment principles. This requirement thus builds in a pre-
ference in favor of the measures developed by the country
with primary management responsibility.

For all or part of the management measures for four
species, Category A procedures would apply. These involve
the greatest degree of management cooperation between the
two countries. Management measures under Category A would
be developed jointly in the Commission.

The Agreement also provides for conciliation and
arbitration of disagreements over management measures for
Category A and B stocks. This will assure that
disagreement between the Parties will not result in
deadlock and leave the stocks unprotected. As noted
however, an objecting Party would have to meet a
substantial burden of persuasion in seeking a modification
of management measures developed by the country with pri-
mary management responsibility for Category B stocks.

The need for coordinated fishery management arose
with extended jurisdiction and presumably will prevail
indefinitely. For this reason, the Agreement undertaken
with Canada has no termination provision. However, once
the maritime boundary between the countries is delimited.

Vll

it may be desirable to modify the national percentage share
entitlements initially agreed between the Parties. The
Agreement recognizes this possibility and provides for
periodic adjustments at ten-year intervals within certain
maximum and minimum limits. In addition, the Agreement
recognizes the need for flexibility in other areas, parti-
cularly with respect to changes in the management cate-
gories of the stocks covered, additions or deletions of
stocks from the Annexes, variations in time limits and
other procedural aspects involved in adopting management
measures, and modifications in management strategy to
foster innovative approaches to managing these resources
and to allow the Parties to benefit from increased scienti-
fic knowledge of the fisheries.

The proposed action represents some departure from
traditional bilateral fishery agreements with their limited
management goals and limited contributions to conservation.
It would establish a comprehensive system for conserving
a broad range of fishery resources. It would have the
flexibility necessary to evolve with increased scientific
knowledge and developing theories of management. Above
all, it would assure that pressure to maximize short term
uses of fishery resources will not be allowed to threaten
long term productivity.

Vlll

Issues to be Resolved

Four alternatives to the Agreement are considered.
These are (1) no Agreement, (2) settlement of the maritime
boundary, only, (3) negotiation of a resource agreement
after delimitation of the maritime boundary, and (4) nego-
tiation of a less comprehensive resource agreement pending
delimitation of a maritime boundary.
Areas of Controversy

The major controversies over the proposed action
involve (1) the Agreement's lack of a termination provision,
(2) certain percentage share entitlements, particularly the
U.S. entitlement of the Georges Bank scallop stock, (3) the
maximum and minimum limits within which entitlements may be
adjusted at 10-year intervals, (4) the extent of Canada's
role in managing stocks in waters claimed by the United
States, and (5) Canada's 10-year entitlement to nine percent
of the annual permissible commercial catch of Loligo squid
in the U.S. zone versus 10-year U.S. entitlements to redfish
in the Canadian zone.
Major Conclusions

Current risks of competitive overfishing are substan-
tial for a number of important stocks in the Georges Bank
disputed zone. These include cod, haddock, pollock, yellow-
tail flounder, and scallops. If the United States and

IX

Canada do not act to protect these stocks, abundance is
likely to decline over time causing significant economic
dislocation for coastal communities in the United States
which are dependent on them. In addition, the risks of
competitive overfishing may also extend to other stocks to
which both countries have access.

The proposed action would reduce these risks by
requiring that both countries agree to total annual harvests
from these resources and by specifying what percentage of
the total each country annually may take. It would also
create a mechanism through which the United States and
Canada may coordinate management policies and develop a
cooperative relationship in the area of fisheries management
Though such cooperation has occurred in the past in various
international commissions and under certain bilateral
agreements, extended jurisdiction now requires even closer
cooperation over a broad range of fisheries management
issues if stocks are to be conserved effectively. Moreover,
the need for such a relationship is likely to become even
more compelling as the fishing industries of both countries
seek to realize the opportunities created for them by
extended jurisdiction. Delimitation of the maritime
boundary in the Georges Bank-Gulf of Maine area, although
important to defining the precise areas of each country's

extended zone, will not alone foster such a relationship.
Were the issues addressed by the proposed action set aside
until after delimitation of the boundary, both countries
could face significant resource conservation problems during
the interim period, and evolution of the needed cooperative
relationship between them could be seriously retarded.

With or without the proposed action, the United States
and Canada will be required in future years to accept some
restraints in the short term to assure long term resource
productivity. The principal advantage of the proposed
action is its assurance that both countries will agree to
do so simultaneously so that short term sacrifices and long
term benefits will be shared. If undertaken in a timely
manner, both countries may avoid the prospect of resource
depletion and consequent economic dislocation that currently
exists in several important fisheries.

XI

Table of Contents

Page

Cover Sheet i

Summary ii

Table of Contents xi

List of Appendices xii

List of Figures xiv

List of Tables xv

I. Purpose and Meed 1

A. Historical Background 1

B. Concepts Underlying the Proposed Action 7

II. Alternatives Including the Proposed Action 9

A. Proposed Federal Action 9

1. Annexes to the Agreement 9

a. Category A Management 10

b. Category B Management 12

c. Category C Management 20

2. East Coast Fisheries Commission 24

3. Management Principles 31

4. Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 34

5. Adjustment Provisions 36

6. Other Provisions 38

a. Limited Access 33

b. Scientific Cooperation 38

c. Reports of Catch and Location Data.... 39

d. Confidentiality of Statistics 39

e. Right to be Considered for Allocation

of Surplus Fish 39

f. Fishing within Twelve Miles of the
Coast 40

g. Fishing by Vessels of Third Party
Countries 40

h. Recreational Fishing 41

i. Herring Transfers 41

j. Observers 41

k . Arrangements in Boundary Region 42

1. Port Access 42

Xll

Page
B. Alternatives to the Proposed Action 43

1 . No Agreement 43

2. Settlement of the I^^aritime Boundary,

Only 45

3. Negotiate a Resource Agreement After
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary. . . 46

4. Negotiation of a Less Comprehensive
Resource Agreement Pending Delimitation

of the Maritime Boundary 49

III, Affected Environment . . . . ' 50

A. The Physical and Biological Environment. ... 50

B. Areas of Special Biological Importance .... 54

C. Human Environment 72

IV. Environmental Consequences .74

A. Impact of the Proposed Action 74

1. Physical Environment 74

2. Biological Environment ... 77

3. Human Environment 89

a. Introduction 89

b. Short-Term Impacts 94

c. Long-Term Impacts 112

B. Environmental Consequences of Alternatives

to the Proposed Action 130

1. No Agreement 130

2. Settlement of the Maritime Boundary,

Only 138

3. Negotiate a Resource Agreement
Subsequent to Delim.itation of a

Maritime Boundary 139

4. Negotiate a Less Comprehensive
Resource Agreement Pending Delimita-
tion of a Maritime Boundary , .145

V. Bibliography 148

VI. List of Preparers 154

VII. List of Reviewers 156

VIII. Appendices Separate Volume Attached

Xlll

List of Appendices

I. Agreement between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of Canada on East Coast
Fishery Resources

II. Brief Biological Description of Species in Annexes to
the Agreement

III. Affected Environment

IV. Profiles of Recent Commercial Fisheries by State and
Selected Ports

XV

List of Figures

Page

Figure 1 - Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank Region;

United States and Canadian Claim Lines

and ICNAF Subareas and Divisions 3

Figure 2 - Category "A" and "B" Management Decision

Paths 13

Figure 3 - Northwest Atlantic Area Map. 51

Figure 4 - Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank Region

Surface Currents Within Slope Water

and Coastal Water Masses 53

Figure 5 - Distributional Charts of Commercially-
Important Species 57

a. Argentine 57

b. Cod 58

c. Cusk 59

d. Haddock 60

e. Red Hake 61

f. Silver Hake 62

g. White Hake 63

h. Herring 64

i. Lobster 65

j . Mackerel 66

k. Pollock 67

1. Redfish 68

m. Scallops 69

n. Loligo squid 70

o. Illex squid 71

Figure 6 - U.S. Sea Scallop Catch, Effort and Catch

Per Unit Effort (CPUE) , Subdivision 5Ze, . . .106

Figure 7 - Landings of Agreement Species Compared
with Total Landings by State
(Maine-Virginia) Ill

Figure 8 - Potential Long-Term Increase (or Decrease)

in Average Annual Harvest 122

Figure 9 - Allocation of Primary Management Authority

by Value of Potential Harvest 125

Figure 10 - Distribution of the Value of Potential

Annual Long-Term Catch Shares 128

XIV

List of Tables

Page

Table I Principal Spawning Areas and Times of

Marine Fishes, Cape Sable to Cape Hatteras . 55-56

Table II Provisional Estimate of Potential Long
Term Sustainable Average Annual Catch
Levels from Selected Stocks (Assuming
Rebuilding and Conservation of Stocks) . . . 91-93

Table III Comparison of Potential Catch with

1978 Total Catch and U.S. Entitlement

at 1978 Total Catch Level with 1978

Actual U.S. Catch for Agreement

Stocks 97-98

Table IV Illustration of Possible Value of the
United States and Canada of Their
Respective Shares of Stocks Covered by
the Agreement in Terms of Potential
Annual Average Long-Term Sustainable
Catch Levels and 1978 Ex-Vessel
Values 117-120

- 1 -

I. PURPOSE AND NEED
This statement analyzes the environmental impact of
ratifying and implementing the Agreement Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
on East Coast Fishery Resources, signed on March 29, 1979
(Appenaix I). This bilateral fisheries agreement with Canada
provides for (1) the conservation and management of east coast
fishery resources of concern to the U.S. and Canada and (2)
reciprocal fishing access. A joint East Coast Fisheries
Commission to provide for cooperative management of fish
stocks is also established.
A. Historical Background

The United States has participated in the multilateral
management of Northwest Atlantic fish resources since 1949, when
it became a party to the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). From 1950 until 1977,
ICNAF and various bilateral agreements with nations fishing
off the east coast of the U.S. served as the vehicles by
which the United States sought to study, manage and conserve
Northwest Atlantic fisheries.

These agreements proved inadequate, particularly in light
of the trend toward extended coastal state jurisdiction over
fishery resources. In 1976, Congress enacted the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (the FCMA) extending exclusive
U.S. fishery management jurisdiction from 12 to 200 miles
effective March 1, 1977.

- 2 -

The FCMA established a national program of management
designed to prevent overfishing and promote the rebuilding
of stocks, while furthering the realization of utilization
of the full potential of the nation's fishery resources.
The FCMA called for the negotiation of fishery agreements
with countries wishing to fish off our coasts and for the
negotiation of agreements establishing maritime boundaries
with countries whose fishery zones are opposite or
adjacent to our own.

Also in 1976, the Canadian Government announced exten-
sion of its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles effective
January 1, 1977. In the Gulf of Maine area, outside the
Strait of Juan de Fuca, at the Dixon Entrance and in the
Beaufort Sea the published limits of U.S. and Canadian fisheries
jurisdiction overlapped. This overlap was most pronounced
on the northeast third of Georges Bank, one of the world's
richest fishing grounds, and traditionally of major impor-
tance to U.S. fishermen (figure 1).

In view of these overlapping claims, both governments
initiated discussions in late 1976 in an effort to resolve
differences. Of more immediate concern, however, was the
management of fishery resources in the boundary region
pending delimitation of the boundary. Absent some agree-
ment, both governments recognized that these resources

- 3 -

Automaied base produced by the Office of The Geograpfler, US Oepanmeni oi S;aie,

Figure 1. Gulf of Maine - Georges Bank Region: United States and
Canadian Boundary Claims.

- 4 -

could be subject to uncoordinated manageraent raeasures, and
both feared that such measures could lead to competition for
fishery resources in the boundary region which might adversely
affect conservation efforts. In addition, both governments
recognized that, to the extent fishery resources of the
boundary region are also present in areas where their respec-
tive exclusive fishery management jurisdiction is not disputed,
management measures in such areas might easily be thwarted by
uncoordinated management measures in the boundary region. Thus,
for 1977, the United States and Canada concluded a reciprocal
fisheries agreement which allowed fishermen of each country
to continue traditional fisheries in the zone of the other
and which limited to recent levels the catches the areas of
undisputed jurisdiction.

In August 1977, President Carter and Prime Minister
Trudeau appointed special representatives with instructions
to negotiate an overall settlement by the end of 1977.
Thereafter, Ambassadors Lloyd N. Cutler for the United '
States and Marcel Cadieux for Canada assumed direction of
the negotiations.

In October 1977 the special representatives submitted
to their governments agreed principles for a long term
comprehensive agreement on fisheries. These principles
included (1) the establishment of a joint fisheries com-
mission, (2) the division of stocks into three categories

- 5 -

to provide for graduated degrees of coordinated inanaqement
action, and (3) the creation of dispute settlement mechanisms,
including the appointment of an impartial arbitrator.

As the negotiations progressed it became apparent that
a comprehensive agreement could not be concluded prior to
the 1978 fishing season. A second one-year interim fisheries
agreement was negotiated and signed. Although the United
States approved, and urged Canada to implement, the 1978
agreement, it was never brought into force due to differing
interpretations of certain provisions. Reciprocal fishing
was informally permitted until June, 1978. Thereafter, each
country excluded fishermen of the other from areas of its
undisputed jurisdiction. Fishermen of both countries con-
tinued operations in the boundary region where the claims
overlapped, subject only to their respective domestic
regulations.

In September 1978 Canada published a second boundary
claim on Georges Bank. The United States Government promptly
informed the Canadian Government that it considered the
claim to be without merit and that any attempts by Canadians
to fish beyond the initial Canadian claim would meet with
U.S. enforcement action.

In November 1978, confirming the earlier fears of
both governments, Canada relaxed the restrictions it had

- p -

placed upon its vessels in the groundfish fishery of the
boundary region in response to what it perceived to be a
similar relaxation of U.S. management measures for United
States vessels. Thereafter, the Canadian catch of haddock,
for example, exceeded by nearly 300 percent that tacitly
understood to be the Canadian share. In the context of the
negotiations, both sides had appeared to agree on the level
of total catch that would be sound from the standpoint of
stock rebuilding efforts. However, these levels were
exceeded in 1978 and accusations continued to be exchanged
as to which side was responsible.

By January 1979, the special representatives had
reached agreement on all but certain details with respect
to Northwest Atlantic fisheries issues. Final negotiations
resolving these details culminated on March 29, 1979, with
the signing of the Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Canada on East
Coast Fishery Resources, as well as the Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Canada to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area. The two agreements are expressly linked; neither can
enter into force without the other.

- 7 -

Pending ratification of the treaties and their entry
into force, east coast fishery relations between the two
countries remain as they have since June 1978: fishermen of
neither country may fish in the area under the undisputed
jurisdiction of the other and no agreement exists with
respect to management measures to be applied in the boundary
region.
B. Concepts Underlying the Proposed Action

The major premise underlying the Fisheries Agreement is
that stocks utilized by two or more nations can only be
protected through a close partnership in cooperative manage-
ment and regulation. Since finfish range over large areas,
management measures applied by one country to a stock in a
part of its range may affect the status of the stock in that
part of a range within the jurisdiction of the other country.
In addition, where stocks of the same species interact between
the zones of the two countries, management measures applied
by one country to stocks in its zone may affect stocks in
the same species in the other country's zone. The north-
eastern portion of Georges Bank is the location of a major
component of the fishery resource traditionally utilized by
the United States. For many species, this is an area of
major abundance. Some species live in the area all year and
others occupy it seasonally. The absence of a mechanism for

- 8 -

coordinated management of these species threatens their
future stability and that of fishermen, processors, and
consumers who utilize these fish.

The management mechanism established by the Agreement
is designed to ensure that each stock of fish will be regulated
in a coordinated manner. The principles applicable to manage-
ment are patterned on the FCMA's national standards. The
entitlements set forth in the Agreement for each country to
preserve historical fishing patterns and to promote conser-
vation by reducing the risks of competitive overfishing.

- 9 -

II. ALTERNATIVES INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION
A. Proposed Federal Action

The proposed federal action is the ratification and
implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Canada on
East Coast Fishery Resources (Appendix I). The Agreement
would institute a comprehensive regime to coordinate
management of fish within the fishery zones of the United
States and Canada and enable the resumption of important
traditional fisheries of each in the areas in which the
other exercises undisputed fisheries jurisdiction.
1 . Annexes to the Agreement

Annexes A, B and C to the Agreement define fisheries
in terms of stocks.* Each of the stocks in the Agreement
was selected on the basis of historical fishing patterns,
management under ICNAF, and its distribution pattern in the
Georges Bank - Gulf of Maine area. As a convenient way to
identify stocks geographically, Annex D labels subareas,
divisions, and subdivisions of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean
in the same manner as under ICNAF (figures 1 and 3). By and

*A stock is a subpopulation of one fish species whose
members interact in a limited geographical area. A stock
may be characterized by a unique spawning place or time and
maintain a separate gene pool. Management measures applied
to one stock will not necessarily impact on other stocks.

- 10 -

large, Annexes A, B, and C list those stocks which will be
subject to Category A, B, and C procedures, respectively.
These management procedures are set forth chiefly in
Articles V, VI, and VII of the Agreement. The Annexes,
however, contain the terms for fishing access and commercial
entitlements and, where appropriate, designate the Party
with management responsibility.
Category A, Management

Management of Category A stocks is truly a joint
exercise of the two countries. Unlike Category B or C
management, neither side is designated as the Party with
primary management responsibility. Management measures are
negotiated in the East Coast Fisheries Commission (see part
2 of this section). Thus the Commission is chiefly respon-
sible for Category A management, subject to approval by the
governments and to the binding dispute settlement process in
case of disagreement (see figure 2a) .

Those resources in Annex A are normally regarded as
transboundary stocks. Outlined below are the stocks listed
in Annex A and the specified share of the annual permissible
commercial catch (PPC) to which the fisherman of each side
are entitled:

- Atlantic mackerel in Subareas 3, 4, 5, and 6:
60 percent for U.S. vessels and 40 percent
for Canadian vessels.

- 11 -

- Pollock in Divisions 4V, 4W and 4X and Subarea 5:
74.4 percent for Canadian vessels and 25.6
percent for U.S. vessels.

- Cusk in Subdivision 5Ze:

66 percent for Canadian vessels and 34 percent
for U.S. vessels.

Management measures for cusk and pollock stocks will be
adopted pursuant to Category A procedures. In the case of
Atlantic mackerel, the annual total allowable catch (TAC)
and PCC will be set according to Category A procedures;
other mackerel management measures will be set according
to Category B procedures, with each Party having primary
management responsibility in its own zone. In addition,
at the beginning of the fourth year of the Agreement, the
Parties will consider whether scientific evidence warrants
setting the TAC for the northern or southern component of
the mackerel stock pursuant to Category B procedures, with
recourse to arbitration in the event of disagreement.

Annex A also contains a special provision for northern
lobster in the boundary region pending delimitation of the
boundary in the Gulf of Maine area. During that period
management will be according to Category A procedures, and
neither side will expand its fishing effort unless autho-
rized by the Commission.

- 12 -

Finally, Category A procedures apply to management
measures concerning size limits of sea scallops (e.g., shell
size and meat counts). Because the rest of the scallop
management measures are to be handled under Category B
procedures the Agreement lists the scallop stock in Annex B.
Category B Management

Category B management involves the designation of one
side or the other as the Party having the primary interest
with respect to management for each stock. Most of the
stocks for which Category B procedures will apply are listed
in Annex B, with the exception of Atlantic mackerel which is
listed in Annex A because the annual TAC and PCC will be set
in accordance with Category A procedures. The Fisheries
Commission's role under Category B management is chiefly to
review proposals by the Party of primary interest. There
is also provision for binding dispute settlement regarding
Category B proposals, but unlike Category A dispute settle-
ment, the Agreement builds in a preference in favor of the
measures proposed by the Party of primary interest. Under
this preference the measures developed by the party of
primary interest will enter into force and remain in effect
unless the Co-Chairmen or Arbitrator find them "clearly
inconsistent" with the management principles set forth in
the Agreement. (See Figure 2b.)

Figure 2a

CATEGORY "A" MANAGEMENT DECISION PATH

FINAL PLAN

ARBITRATOR

CO-CHAIRMEN

ATTEMPT TO

RESOLVE DISPUTE

COMMISSION
RECONVENES TO

RESOLVE
DISAGREEMENT

COMMISSION PREPARES
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN

COMMISSION REACHES

PARTIAL OR NO AGREED

PLAN

COMMISSION CONVENES

Path of Agreement
Path of Disagreement

Figure 2b

CATEGORY "B" MANAGEMENT DECISION PATH

FINAL PLAN

DISPUTED MEASURES FOUND NOT
INCONSISTENT ARE RETAINED IN PLAN

ARBITRATOR

CO-CHAIRMEN REVIEW ONLY
FOR CLEAR INCONSISTENCY

OBJECTIONS ONLY ON GROUND THAT
MANAGEMENT MEASURES OR
MODIFICATIONS ARE CLEARL Y
INCONSISTENT WITH GOVERNING
PRINCIPLES

ENTIRE PLAN GOES INTO EFFECT
PENDING RULING ON OBJECTIONS.
IF ANY

_l_

COMMISSION REVIEWS PLAN -
MAY PROPOSE MODIFICATIONS

Path of Agreed Provisions
and Modifications

Patti of Objections, If Any

Patfi If Commission Does
Not Reacfi Agreement

- 15 -

It is essential to understand that the Agreement gives
Canada and the United States equal power to object regarding
annual management measures for Annex A and B stocks. The
nature of the power depends on whether the stock concerned
is under joint management responsibility pursuant to Annex
A procedures, under the primary responsibility of the
United States pursuant to Annex B procedures, or under
the primary responsibility of Canada pursuant to Annex B
procedures.

In the case of Annex A stocks, both Canada and the
United States have the right to object to annual measures
agreed upon by the Commission. Whenever such an objection
is made, the Co-Chairmen or the Arbitrator will make the
final decision on the management measures to be applied,
after considering the viewpoints of each side. It can be
anticipated that the governments will be reluctant to
object to measures worked out in the Commission by their
respective fishery experts (the majority of whom on the
U.S. side will be Regional Fishery Management Council
members), because the outcome of dispute settlement is
beyond their own control.

- 16 -

In the case of Annex B stocks under the primary respon-
sibility of the United States, Canada is in a subordinate
position. The U.vS. proposals for annual management measures
will take effect unless the Commission agrees on modifications
to which the United States does not object. Canada may
object to the proposed or modified measures, but the measures
as approved by the United States will remain in effect despite
an objection unless and until the Co-Chairmen or the Arbitrator
overrule them and substitute alternative measures. Canada's
chances of prevailing in an objection are limited since
neither the Co-Chairmen nor the Arbitrator may overrule the
U. S. -approved measures without finding the measures to be
"clearly inconsistent" with the Agreement's governing prin-
ciples, which are patterned on the FCMA's national standards.
Because of the flexibility of the governing principles,
clearly inconsistent measures are likely to be encountered
infrequently. As in the Annex A situation, it can be expected
that Canada will be reluctant to exercise its objection
power with respect to proposed measures or modifications
that have been supported in the Commission by its own fishery
experts .

Listed below, according to the Party having primary
management responsibility, are the Annex B stocks for which
the fishermen on each side are entitled to a specified
share of the PCC:

- 17 -

(a) Stocks under the Primary Responsibility of
the United States

- Atlantic herring in Division 5Y, excluding
Grand Manan Banks and not including the
juvenile herring fishery within three
nautical miles of the U.S. coast: 100
percent for U.S. vessels.

- Atlantic herring in Division 5Z and
Subarea 6:

FIRST THREE-YEAR PERIOD — 2000 m.t. for
Canadian and the remainder for U.S. vessels;

- SECOND THREE-YEAR PERIOD — Canadian vessels
may catch 2000 m.t. plus 50 percent of the
portion of the PCC that exceeds 21,000 m.t.,
U.S. vessels may catch 100 percent of the
first 21,000 m.t. of the PCC, less 2000 m.t.,
as well as 50 percent of the portion above
21,000 m.t. However, Canadian vessels will
be entitled to one-third of PCC if the total
PCC is 45,000 m.t. or above;

AFTER SIX YEARS — one-third for Canadian
vessels and two-thirds for U.S. vessels.

- Sea scallops in Subdivision 5Ze (Canada
has primary management responsibility east

- 18 -

of 68° 30' west longitude and the United
States west of 68° 30' west longitude,
except for management measures related
to size limits, which are determined in
accordance with Category A procedures):
73.35 percent for Canadian vessels and
26.65 percent for U.S. vessels.

- Atlantic cod in Division 5Z:

83 percent for U.S. vessels and 17
percent for Canadian vessels.

- Haddock in Subarea 5:

79 percent for U.S. vessels and 21 percent
for Canadian vessels.

- Silver hake in Subdivision 5Ze:

90 percent for U.S. vessels and 10 percent
for Canadian vessels.

- Red hake in Subdivision 5Ze:

90 percent for U.S. vessels and 10 percent
for Canadian vessels.

- White hake in Subarea 5:

94 percent for U.S. vessels and 6 percent
for Canadian vessels.
(b) Stocks Under the Primary Responsibility of
Canada

- Atlantic herring in Divisions 4W and 4X

- 19 -

and in the portion of Division 5Y which
encompasses the Grand Manan Banks, not
including the juvenile herring fishery
within three nautical miles of Canada's
coast: 100 percent for Canadian vessels.
-. Atlantic argentine in Divisions 4V, 4W, and
4X and in Subarea 5: 75 percent for Canadian
vessels and 25 percent for U.S. vessels.
- White hake in Divisions 4V, 4W and 4X:
94 percent for Canadian vessels and 6
percent for U.S. vessels.
With respect to Atlantic herring stocks, there are two
additional provisions not noted above. The first deals with
access to the stock in Division 5Z and Subarea 6, limiting
U.S. vessels to the area west of 66° west longitude and
Canadian vessels to the area east of 68° 30' west longitude.
The second provision calls for a review of the management
categorizations of the herring stocks at the end of the
first and second three-year periods, with the second review
being subject to binding dispute settlement.

In general, vessels of both countries may have access
to the areas in which the Annex B stocks are located.
However, access for U.S. vessels to the white hake stock
in Divisions 4V, 4W and 4X is limited to Division 4X.

- 20 -

Access to the white hake stock in Subarea 5, on the other
hand, is limited for Canadian vessels to Subdivision 5Ze
and that portion of Division 5Y which is in the Canadian
fishery zone.

The final paragraph in Annex B pertains to Illex
squid in Subareas 3, 4, 5, and 6. Canada has primary
management responsibility for the portion of the stock
in Subareas 3 and 4 and the United States the primary
responsibility for the portion in Subareas 5 and 6. Pend-
ing delimitation of the boundary in the Georges Bank - Gulf
of Maine area, vessels of neither side are to fish for Illex
squid in the boundary region (unless otherwise agreed);
access to the rest of the stock is limited for vessels of
each Party to that Party's fishery zone.
Category C Managemen t

Annex C lists stocks which occur primarily in one
country's fishery zone but in which an interest of the other
Party is accomodated under the terms of this Agreement.
One Party or the other is invested with management respon-
sibility. Selection of appropriate management measures is
entirely within the discretion of the country having manage-
ment responsibility. Except under special circumstances.
Category C measures may not be implemented until the other
side has had an opportunity for consultation at a Commission

- 21 -

meeting. The Party not having management responsibility can-
not invoke binding dispute settlement under the Agreement to
seek a change in management measures; neither the Co-Chairmen
nor the Arbitrator has the power under any circumstances to
impose its own management measures in lieu of the measures
selected by the Party with management responsibility.

The Annex C stocks for which fishermen on each side are
entitled to a specified share of the PCC for an indefinite
period are broken down as follows, according to the country
with management responsibility:

( 1) Stocks under the Responsibility of the United
States

- Atlantic cod in Subarea 5Y :

98.4 percent for U.S. vessels and 1.6
percent for Canadian vessels.

- Atlantic redfish in Subarea 5:
99 percent for U.S. vessels and
1 percent for Canadian vessels.

- Other Atlantic groundfish (e.g., yellowtail
flounder) in Subarea 5: 99 percent for
U.S. vessels and 1 percent for Canadian
vessels.

(2 ) Stocks under the Responsibility of Canada

- Atlantic cod in Division 4W and Subdivision
4Vs: 98.6 percent for Canadian vessels
and 1.4 percent for U.S. vessels.

- 22 -

- Atlantic cod in Division 4X, the offshore
portion: 92.5 percent for Canadian vessels
and 7.5 percent for U.S. vessels.

- Haddock in Division 4X: 90 percent for
Canadian vessels. .

- Other Atlantic groundfish in Subareas 3
and 4: 99 percent for Canadian vessels
and 1 percent for U.S. vessels.

Fishing access for Category C stocks is the same for
vessels of both sides, except that "other Atlantic ground-
fish" in the other Party's zone may be caught only
incidentally.

Special provisions relate to Atlantic redfish stocks
within undisputed Canadian jurisdiction, the Loligo squid
stock (which is primarily within undisputed U.S. jurisdiction),
northern lobster after determination of the boundary,
incidental catch, and fishing by U.S. vessels in the vicinity
of Grand Manan Island.

The right of U.S. vessels to fish for redfish in the
undisputed portion of the Canadian fishery zone expires ten
years after the Agreement enters into force. All of these
redfish stocks are under Canadian management responsibility.
During the ten-year period U.S. vessels will have the right
to catch 35 percent of the PCC for the redfish stock in
Divisions 4V, 4W, and 4X. In addition, U.S. vessels have
a conditional interest of 10 percent in any portion of the

- 23 -

redfish stock in Divisions 4R, 4S, and 4T that Canada
decides to set aside for vessels based outside the Gulf of
St Lawrence. Finally, U.S. vessels have a right to take
600 metric tons (MT) of redfish from Subarea 3 stocks.
Until the maritime boundary between France and Canada is
determined (involving two French islands off the coast of
Newfoundland) , the 600 MT must be taken from the stock in
Division 3-0 (figure 3). After the determination of that
boundary, the United States and Canada may, upon application
by the United States, agree to switch the entitlement to the
stock in Division 3P.

The Loligo squid rights of Canadian vessels are limited
to the ten year period following entry into force of the
Agreement. The stock, located in Division 5Z and Subarea 6,
is under the management responsibility of the United States.
During the ten-year period Canadian vessels are authorized
to catch 9 percent of the PCC. In order to curtail gear
conflicts, the United States is authorized to impose more
restrictive measures on Canadian vessels than on its own.
However, such regulation shall be designed to give Canadian
vessels an opportunity to catch the full entitlement with-
out undue fishing hardship.

The northern lobster provision becomes applicable upon
determination of the boundary in the Gulf of Maine area.
The stock, located in Subarea 4 and 5, is to be under split
management: each side will manage the portion in its own

- 24 -

fishery zone. Similarly, rights of fishing access for each
country's vessels are limited to its own zone. However, parties
may agree to reciprocal access, in which case questions of
gear restrictions are subject to arbitration.
2 . East Coast Fisheries Commission

Chapter I of the Agreement deals with fisheries manage-
ment and provides for the establishment of the bilateral
East Coast Fisheries Commission. The Commission will take
into account the management programs of the states and fish
caught in state waters. Each Party will appoint seven members
to form that Party's national section. Commission members
will serve at the pleasure of the appointing Party. Each
Party will pay the expenses of its national section. All
other expenses of the Commission will be borne by the Parties
in equal shares. The Commission will determine an annual
budget for submission to the Parties for their approval.

The Agreement provides that the Commission's headquarters
will be located at a place to be determined by the Parties.
It is anticipated that the headquarters will be located
within the United States in the New England area.

The Commission will appoint an Executive Secretary and
such staff as are agreed by the Parties. With the approval
of the Parties, the Commission may establish a Scientific
Committee and such other committees as are necessary to carry
out its functions.

- 25 -

The Commission will meet as often as necessary to carry
out its functions but must .meet at least once each calendar
year.

Decisions of the Commission are to be taken by the affirm-
tive vote of both national sections. The Commission will:

(1) Determine the initial fishing year for Category
A stocks within 45 days after entry into force of
the Agreement;

(2) Review proposals submitted to it by the Party of
primary interest concerning the initial fishing year
for Category B stocks and agree on such proposals
within 75 days after entry into force of the Agreement;

(3) Agree within six months after entry into force of
the Agreement on historical ratios of each Party's
annual recreational catch to total recreational and
commercial catch;

(4) Determine annual management measures ^oc Category
A stocks in accordance with the management principles
contained in the Agreement;

(5) Review annual management measures proposed by
the Party of primary interest for Category B stocks
to ensure their consistency with the management
principles contained in the Agreement;

- 26 -

(6) Serve as a forum for consultation between the
Parties with respect to annual management measures
contemplated for Category C stocks by the Party
having management responsibility;

(7) Recommend to the Parties the amendment of any
provision of the Annexes to the Agreement, including
the addition or deletion of stocks, the transfer of
stocks from one Annex to another , and changes in
fishing entitlements and access areas;

(8) Coordinate the collection of statistics and
make recommendations to the Parties for cooperative
research programs;

(9) Determine the amount to be deducted from the
entitlement of either Party for the following
fishing year or years should either exceed its annual
entitlement in a given year.

In addition to the Commission members, the Commission
will have two Co-Chairmen jointly appointed by the Parties.
The Co-chairmen may not be nationals of the same Party and
will not form part of the national section of either Party.
The Co-chairmen will preside over Commission meetings and
carry out their duties and responsibilities in an impartial
manner. Co-Chairmen will serve initial terms of five years
but may be reappointed. Either Party at any time may with-
draw its consent to the service of a Co-Chairman; in such
case, the Parties jointly will appoint a successor.

- 27 -

During Commission deliberations, the Co-Chairmen will
facilitate and guide discussions, but have no voting power
The Co-chairmen will:

(1) Atteinpt to resolve disputes if either Party
objects to management measures recommended by the
Commission for Category A stocks, or if the
Commission is unable to agree on such measures;

(2) Attempt to resolve questions referred to them
by a Party which maintains that management measures
proposed by the Party of primary interest for
Category B stocks are clearly inconsistent with the
management principles contained in the Agreement;

(3) Make amendments of limited duration to manage-
ment measures for Category A stocks and propose to
the Commission the extended application of such
amendments, in the event the stocks in question are
threatened with serious and immediate harm due to
unforeseen circumstances arising during the fishing
year, or if there is an economic emergency that can
be alleviated without significant adverse effects on
conservation of the stocks;

(4) Attempt to resolve any other question involving
the application or interpretation of the Agreement
referred to them by either or both Parties;

- 28 -

(5) Award appropriate relief if they decide that
management measures proposed by the Party of
primary interest for Category B stocks are clearly
inconsistent with the management principles
contained in the Agreement;

(5) Award appropriate relief in the case of a
dispute involving the application or interpreta-
tion of the Agreement if they decide that a
provision of the Agreement has been contravened.
The Agreement also provides that an Arbitrator be
appointed jointly by the Parties. Should the Parties be
unable to agree, the arbitrator shall be appointed by the
Country of International Justice, in which case the Arbitrator
may not be a national or permanent resident of the United
States or Canada. ^

The Arbitrator will serve for a term of five years but
may be reappointed. Either Party at any time may withdraw
its consent to the service of the Arbitrator; in such case
the Parties jointly will appoint a successor. The Parties
will determine the remuneration and expenses of the Arbitrator,
which costs will be included in the Commission's budget as
joint expenses. Office facilities and services at the
Commission's headquarters will be provided. The Arbitrator
will be entitled to attend all meetings of the Commission

- 29 -

and wiii be provided with copies of all Commission minutes

and aocuments when they are issued.
The Arbitrator will:

(L) Decide any dispute related to the determination
of the appropriate initial fishing year for each
Categoty A stock if either Party objects to the
decision of the Commission or if the Commission
cannot reach a decision;

(2) Decide any dispute related to the appropriate
initial fishing year for each Category B stock, if
the Commission cannot agree to the proposal made by
the Party of priiaary interest;

(3) Decide disputes related to the appropriate
ratio of historical annual recreational catch to
commercial catch if either Party oDjects to the
decision of the Commission;

(4) Decide disputes related to extending the
application of emergency measures for Category A
stocks proposed by the Co-Chairmen;

(5) Decide disputes related to emergency measures
for Category B stocks proposed by the Party of
primary interest;

(6) Adjust entitlements for the following fishing
year to restore the balance of fishing opportunities

- 30 -

if he decides that an amended management measure for
a Category B stock will deprive a Party of its
proportionate share of the catch during a given
fishing year and that deprivation cannot be rectified
during that fishing year;

(7) Redetermine entitlements within certain limits
at ten-year intervals if such redetermination is
requested by a Party and the Parties have been
unable to agree on adjusted entitlements;

(8) Decide questions with respect to time limits

or other administrative procedures contained in the
Agreement if, at any time after five years from the
entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties are
unable to reach agreement on a requested change;

(9) Decide disputes with respect to management
measures for Category A stocks that cannot be
resolved by the Commission, the Parties, or the
Co-chairmen;

(10) Decide any disputes related to management
measures for any Category B stock proposed by the
Party of primary interest if the other Party has
objected to the measures and the Co-Chairmen cannot
resolve the dispute;

- 31 -

(11) Decide questions related to the application
or interpretation of the Agreement that cannot be
resolved by the Co-Chairmen on referral by a Party,
and review decisions of the Co-Chairmen on such
matters to ensure their consistency with his prior
decisions;

(12) Determine the amount to be deducted from the
entitlement of either Party for the following
fishing year or years should either Party exceed its
annual entitlement in a given year and should the
Commission be unable to resolve the matter.

3 . Management Principles

In order to guide the two governments and the Com-
mission in formulating management measures for Category A
and B stocks. Article X of the Agreement sets forth seven
fishery management principles. The Co-Chairmen and Arbitrator
are required to apply these principles in resolving disputes
over Category A or B management measures. A few of the
principles apply to Category C stocks, primarily to ensure
equitable treatment of the fishermen of the Party not
having management responsibility.

These principles closely parallel the National Standards
of the FCMA. Slightly paraphrased, the management principles
are as follows:

- 32 -

(i) Management .Measures tor Category A and B stocks
snail De aesignea to (a) achieve the optimum yield
from each stock, taking into account stock inter-
relationships and all other relevant ecological
factors and the nature and extent of the economic
and social interests of each Party in the stock,
(d) briny about an exploitation rate that will
maintain the long-term productivity of fishery
resources (unless otherwise agreed), and
(c) prevent overfishing ot fishery resources,
allow rebuilding of depleted stocks, and avoid
irreversible or long-term adverse effects on
fishery resources and the marine environment.

(2) Management measures for Category A and B
stocks shall be based on the best scientific
information available.

(3) Management measures for Category A and B
stocks shall take into account demonstrated
degrees of stock and species interrelationships
so that the productive potential of related
stocks or species is not seriously threatened.

(4) Management measures for Category A and B stocks
shall take into account the need for efficiency in
administration and enforcement, the avoidance of

- 33 -

unnecessary duplication, the need for maintaining
the confidence of each Party in the administration
and enforcement actions of the other Party, and the
need to avoid disruptive changes in patterns of
exploitation.

(5) Management measures for Category A, B, and C
stocks shall provide to the fishermen of each side
the opportunity to catch their entitlement to the
stock in question.

(6) Management measures for Category A, B, and C
stocks shall ensure access by each Party's fishermen
to specified areas within the other Party's undisputed
jurisdiction in order to catch entitlements, to

the extent the Agreement permits such access.

(7) Management measures for Category A, B, and C
stocks shall not discriminate in form or effect
between the fishermen of the Parties (except for the
Loligo squid stock, in which case Canadians vessels
may be regulated more strictly than Americans).
Management measures adopted through the Commission's

procedures are intended to be final and binding; however,
recognizing that some flexibility is required in cases
affecting serious and immediate harm to resources. Article
VII provides for an expedited procedure for putting manage-
ment measures into force.

- 34 -

4 . Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

The Agreement establishes a binding dispute settlement
mechanism which is a cornerstone of the Agreement. The goal
is to have the best resource management program in force and
to guarantee that decisions will be made in a timely manner.
This mechanism is an incentive to the national sections to
reach agreement on management issues.

The Co-chairmen and the Arbitrator are the central
figures in the binding dispute settlement system. Their
decisions on disputes pertaining to Category A and B manage-
ment measures and to interpretations of the Agreement shall
be binding on the Parties. Category C management measures
are not subject to the Agreement's dispute settlement system.

The Arbitrator in most instances may not consider a
dispute until the Co-Chairmen have attempted to decide the
matter and have failed to reach agreement within the time
limit stated in the Agreement. Notable exceptions are the
expedited settlement procedures for disputes concerning
initial fishing years, historical ratios of recreational
catch to commercial catch, and emergency amendments to
annual management measures. Under these expedited proce-
dures a dispute will not be addressed by the Co-Chairmen
but will go directly to the Arbitrator for resolution.

- 35 -

In the case of the redetermination of national entitlements,
which may occur once every' ten years, the Arbitrator will
receive disputes directly from the Parties.

Dispute settlement for Category A management measures
is distinctly different from dispute settlement for Category
B measures. In a dispute related to annual management
measures for a Category A stock, for example, the Co-Chairmen
or the Arbitrator, as the case may be, will have the
discretion to formulate whatever management measures they
consider appropriate in light of presentations by both
sides. Those measures will be legally binding on the Parties
at the time of the decision. However, in the case of a dis-
pute over management ineasures proposed for a Category B stock
by the Party of primary management responsibility, the Co-
Chairmen and the Arbitrator have a more confined role.
Before they may substitute their own management measures for
those proposed by the Party of primary interest, they must
find that the proposed management measures are "clearly
inconsistent" with the Agreement's management principles.

When questions regarding management measures are
referred to them, the Co-Chairmen have fifteen days to
reach agreement; on matters involving the application or
interpretation of the Agreement, they must act within thirty
days. In the case of the Arbitrator various time limits

- 36 -

apply, from periods of as little as fifteen days for emergency
management measures during the fishing year to more than one
year for redetermination of national catch entitlements.
Normally the Arbitrator must decide on management measures
thirty days after assuming jurisdiction over each question
and on other matters ninety days after assuming jurisdiction.

Agreed decisions of the Co-Chairmen within the pre-
scribed time limits are binding on the Parties, subject to
the right of the Parties to agree on different relief or
to refer the question to the Arbitrator on the basis of
inconsistency with the Arbitrator's prior decisions.
Similarly the Arbitrator's decisions are legally binding,
although either Party may request review of a decision in
light of new factors of decisive importance not previously
known or discoverable. Within thirty days after making each
decision the Co-Chairmen and Arbitrator must issue a reasoned
opinion explaining the basis for decision.
5 . Adjustment Provisions

The Agreement is of indefinite duration and contains no
provision for unilateral termination upon notice to the other
Party. Because of this permanent character, the Agreement
includes provisions for adjustment of certain rights of the
Parties. The first such provision pertains to the right of
either Party, at ten year intervals, to request a review of

- 37 -

any of the national catch entitlements for stocks covered by
the Agreement. The second requires the review of any time
limit or other administrative procedure, at the request of
either Party at any time after five years following the
Agreement's entry into force. Both provisions call for
mandatory binding dispute settlement by the Arbitrator
after a stated time for the end of negotiations — after the
first nine months of the ninth year of each ten-year interval
in which a Party requests an entitlement redetermination
and after six months from the date a Party requests review
of an administrative procedure.

The entitlement redetermination provision contains a
number of special conditions, outlined as follows:

(a) Each redetermined entitlement enters into force
in the fishing year following the redetermination and
remains in force until a subsequent redetermination.

(b) In general, a redetermination by the Arbitrator
must reflect the average annual proportion of the stock in
question which occurs in the fishery zone of each Party,
except that the Arbitrator may moderate a change in entitle-
ment to take into account economic and social ramifications.

(c) Notwithstanding the principle of proportionate dis-
tribution within the zones of the Parties, the Arbitrator's
ability to reduce an entitlement is limited by two types of
restrictions. First, there is a limit on the extent to which

- 38 -

an entitlement percentage may be decreased from one ten-year
period to the next. If a Party's entitlement upon the Agree-
ment's entry into force was fifty percent or more of the
annual permissible commercial catch, that entitlement could
be decreased by no more than ten percent at each ten year
interval. If an entitlement upon the Agreement's entry
into force was less than fifty percent, the periodic decrease
could be no more than five percent. Second, there is a
restriction applicable to the overall reduction of a Party's
original entitlement as a result of successive redeterminations,
This overall reduction may not exceed one-third of the
original entitlement. .
6 . Other Provisions

a. Limited Access . For any Category A, B, or C stock,
the Agreement authorizes the establishment of a system for
limiting access to the fishery or restricting fishing to
certain vessels or fishermen. However, two conditions must
be satisfied first: (1) the system must be directly related
to conservation and must not be for the purpose of economic
allocation and (2) notwithstanding the Agreement's dispute
settlement provisions, the system must be expressly approved
by both Parties.

b. Scientific Cooperation . The Agreement calls for the
Parties and the Commission to share scientific data involving
the work of the Commission. The Commission is authorized

to collect statistics and make recommendations to the

- 39 -

Parties for cooperative research. The Agreement also
encourages the continuation, and in appropriate instances
the expansion, of cooperation in fishery research between
the Parties.

c. Reports of Catch and Location Data . The Agreement
requires fishermen of both countries to report catch and
related data in a manner determined by the Commission. The
Agreement also authorizes each Party, for fishing in its
fishery zone, to require the other Party's fishermen engaged
in such fishing to make reports of catch and location data
at reasonable intervals.

d. Confidentiality of Statistics . Both the Parties and
the Commission are required to preserve the confidential
nature of the records or statistics of individual catches
and individual company operations.

e. Right to be Considered for Allocation of Surplus Fish .
The Agreement envisions two types of situations that may give
rise to a decision by one Party, with respect to fish in which
its own fishermen have a preferential interest, to allow
fishermen of the other Party to harvest such fish. One type
of situation involves a portion of an entitlement to a
Category A, B, or C stock which is surplus to the granting
Party's requirements; the other involves the surplus portion
of a stock not in any of the three Agreement categories

- 40 -

(e.g., sharks, sand lance). In either type of situtation
the Agreement simply requires that the granting Party give
consideration to a request by the other Party for an alloca-
tion. In short, it has the same practical effect as a
Governing International Fishery Agreement (GIFA) negotiated
pursuant to bection 201 of the FCWA. If U.S. fishermen
will be unable to harvest the entire U.S. entitlement to a
given Category A, B, or C stock, or the entire FCMA optimum
yield of a fishery not covered by the Agreement, the United
States may allocate the surplus portion among Canada and
foreign countries that have entered into GIFA's. The
Agreement ^^laces Canada on an equal footing with GIFA
countries insofar as eligibility for an allocation of surplus
is concerned.

t. Fishing Within Twelve Miles of the Coast . With a
single exception, the Agreement requires that commercial
fishermen of one side, when inside the other side's fishery
zone, conduct their fishing seaward of twelve nautical miles
from the coast. The exception allows U.S. fishermen to fish
in the area between three and twelve nautical miles from
Grand Manan Island in the Canadian zone.

g. Fishing by Vessels of Third Party Countries . Each
Party is authorized under the Agreement to permit fishing of
a portion of its entitlement by vessels of third party coun-
tries. However, such third party fishing may occur only in

- 4 J. -

the undisputed portion of the granting Party's fishery zone,
may be authorized only a year at a time, and must be subject
to management measures at least as restrictive as those in
force under the Agreement.

h. Recreational Fishing . Nationals and vessels of each
Party are guaranteed access to all areas covered by the
Agreement, subject to applicable regulations and permit and
licensing requirements (except foreign fishing requirements
set by the federal law of Canada or the United States) . The
historical ratio of recreational to commercial catch, to be
determined in the first year after the Agreement enters into
force, forms the basis for controlling the recreational
harvest of Category A, B, and C stocks. Any recreational
catch that exceeds a Party's historical ratio must be counted
against the commercial entitlement for the same stock. Thus
a Party may have to decide how much it is willing to permit
its recreational fishery to expand, given the fact that
expansion beyond the historical ratio will reduce the amount
of fish available to its commercial fishermen.

i. Herring Transfers . The Agreement authorizes the
continuation of at-sea transfers of herring between vessels
of both Parties in the Gulf of Maine-Bay of Fundy area.

j. Observers . To monitor activities in areas under its
undisputed jurisdiction, each Party has the right under the

- 42 -

Agreement to place its observers on the vessels of the other
party operating in these areas.

k. Arrangements in Boundary Region . Pending the delimi-
tation of a maritime boundary, interim arrangements in the
boundary region are to be continued. As between nationals
and vessels of each Party, flag state enforcement will be
the rule. No vessels of third party countries may be
authorized to fish in the boundary region and both Parties
are authorized to enforce against such vessels.

1. Port Access . The Agreement makes the customs
ports of each Party available to nationals and vessels of
both Parties for the purposes of purchasing bait, supplies,
outfits, and fuel, and for effecting repairs. Such access
is subject to general requirements for advance notice of
port entry, availability of facilities, and the needs of
domestic fishermen and their vessels.

- 43 -

B. Alternatives to the Proposed Action

The proposed action is inherently flexible, partly to
encourage innovative resource management and to respond to
changing conditions of the stocks and national objectives.
Thus, the Agreement embraces an almost infinite number of
access and management alternatives. There are, however, four
alternatives to the proposed action that have been identified.
These are:

1. No agreement.

2. Settlement of the maritime boundary, only.

3. Negotiation of a resource agreement after
delimitation of the maritime boundary.

4. Negotiation of a less comprehensive resource
agreement pending delimitation of the
maritime boundary

1. No Agreement

This alternative implies a continuation of the current
overlap of U.S. and Canadian management programs on the east
coast. The establishment of 200-mile fishery zones in 1977
identified a serious difference between the two countries as
to the location of the maritime boundary in the Georges Bank
- Gulf of Maine area. Although it had been apparent since
the 1960 's that there was a difference between the United
States and Canada on this point, the requirement of managing
fisheries within defined areas greatly exacerbated the problem.

- 44 -

With the establishment of overlapping fishery zones on
Georges Bank, the two countries entered into the 1977 Recip-
rocal Fisheries Agreement which set forth the following regime
in the boundary region:

1. Vessels of both Parties would fish subject
to flag state regulation.

2. As between the Parties, enforcement would
be conducted by the flag state.

3. Neither Party would authorize fishing by
vessels of third parties in the boundary
region.

4. Either Party could enforce against third
parties in the boundary region.

Since 1977, there has been no agreement in force relating
to the boundary region although there continues to be a
"gentlemen's agreement" on these three points. Conducting
ourselves in this manner has allowed us to avoid actions which
would be regarded by the other side as having a juridical
content which could not be recognized. However, at the same
time, it has meant that both countries have allowed their
fishermen to fish in the boundary region without regard to the
fishery activities of the other country on the same stocks in
the same area. The fact that we are dealing with the claimed
rights of both countries makes the matter very difficult and
potentially explosive. The agreements defuse this difficult

- 45 -

situation. It has been suggested that the shared interest of
the U.S. and Canada in the stability of the valuable east
coast fishery would be sufficient for botli parties to prevent
competitive overfishing by their fishermen, and that through
informal governmental consultations, greater management flexi-
bility would prevail than under the proposed agreement.
However, Section I (A) of this statem.ent narrates tlie failure
of informal consultations during 1978 to produce interim
agreement on fisheries conservation and management goals or
to prevent competitive fishing for major stocks such as
haddock, cod, pollock and scallops, leading to catches m
excess of the expectations of either country. It also led
Canada to expell U.S. fishing vessels from the Canadian zone.

Maintaining the status quo would continue to inhibit
management of stocks as a unit throughout their range. More-
over, it would leave unresolved the fundamental issue, namely,
how valuable marine resources which are liighly vulnerable to
overfishing, available to both countries, and in great demand
are to be shared and managed so as to preserve their long
term productivity.

2 . Settlement of thg Maritime Boundary, Only
This alternative proposes that only the boundary be
resolved and that management of the marine environment includ-
ing fisheries management should be carried out by the U.S.
and Canada thereafter, each on its own side of tlie boundary.
Resolution of the boundary alone would clearly define the
maritime areas over which each party exercises fisheries
jurisdiction, and thereby eliminate the present area of over-
lapping jurisdictional claims. Any boundary other than

- 46 -

that which fully adopts to the U.S. position would perpetuate
the current situation in which certain valuable fishery
stocks can be caught in both countries' fishery zones.
Thus, the absence of a fisheries agreement would leave
unresolved the problems noted above in connection with
Alternative 1 of how such transboundary resources are to
be shared and managed so as to preserve their long term
productivi ty.

During the consultations leading to the signing of the
proposed agreements concerning Atlantic fisheries and the
maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank area, the
special negotiators concluded that the only practical way to
resolve the divergent boundary claims of the two countries was
through submission of the issue to binding third party dispute
settlement. A basic position of Canada has been that it will
agree to binding adjudication of the maritime boundary only in
conjunction with the implementation of a resource agreement
that would survive the boundary determination. The United
States cannot unilaterally submit the issue to third party
settlement; Canadian agreement to accept such binding third
party delimitation is required.

3 . Negotiate a Resource Agreement After Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary

This alternative proposes that no management regime be
constructed until the maritime boundary delimitation has been
completed.

If the United States position were fully upheld in the
boundary adjudication, the U.S. would be under no obligation

-Al-
to allow Canada access to Georges Bank and would be able to
manage unilaterally the stocks that do not range beyond Geroges
Bank or other Gulf of Maine areas under exclusive U.S.
fisheries jurisdiction. But, as indicated in the discussion
of alternative 2 above, herring, pollock, and mackeral would
range across the boundary and require coordinated management
by the United States and Canada.

On the other hand, if the Canadian boundary position
should prevail, Canada could bar U.S. fishermen from the
northeastern third of Georges Bank, an extremely important
area for scallops, haddock, cod, yellowtail flounder, and many
other species. Since almost all of the stocks on Georges Bank
would be transboundary , the cooperation of Canada in managing
these stocks would be essential. If the boundary established
undisputed Canadian jurisdiction over an important part
of the range of these Georges Bank stocks, it is reason-
able to anticipate that both countries would insist on an
equal voice in managing the Georges Bank stocks. The proposed
action provides the United States with primary management
responsibility for the great majority of Georges Bank stocks,
no matter where the boundary falls (see Section II). It has
been suggested that by waiting until a maritime boundary
is determined the two countries would find it easier to
work out a sharing agreement for those stocks occurring
throughout the boundary region. This, however, would not
necessarily be true. For example, a boundary dividing the

- 48 -

disputed northeastern section of Georges Bank would not
determine the share of fish either country should catch on its
side of the line. An intensification of effort might be anti-
cipated from the fishermen of either country in any portion of
the northeast peak of Georges Bank that remained available to
them, if it would assist them in avoiding socio-economic
dislocation. An illustration of the effect of an intensfi-
cation of effort occurred in the fall of 1978 when Canadian
vessels took a substantially higher share (39 percent) than
in recent years of the total Gulf of Maine and Georges
Bank haddock catch through concentrated fishing on just
the northeast part of Georges Bank.

It is possible that a country having the predominant
proportion of a particular stock on its side of the boundary
might find that the other country, through more intensive
fishing in a limited area, was taking a disproportionate share
of the optimum yield from the stock in the interest of
avoiding disruption to its established fisheries. This could
make it even more difficult to negotiate a resource agreement
after a boundary settlement than before. The Agreement,
on the other hand, takes account of the eventual outcome of
the boundary settlement and provides for an adjustment of
entitlements partly based on the average annual proportion of
each stock occurring in the fishery zone of each Party.

It is probable that a resource agreement negotiated
subsequent to boundary delimitation would result in a manage-
ment framework very similar to that in the proposed action.
Access and shares might vary according to the location of the

- 49 -

boundary, but — under this alternative — U.S. fishermen would
lose the protection provided to them by the Agreement against
sudden changes in shares after the boundary delimitation.

Finally, there would be a hiatus of several years with
continued overlapping management of important stocks on
Georges Bank, which would present the difficulties mentioned
in connection with Alternative 1.

4. Negotiation of a Less Comprehensive Resource Agree-
ment Pending Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary

Implicit in this alternative is the recognition that
deferral of a definitive resource agreement until after the
delimitation of the maritime boundary requires an interim
agreement to address some of the unresolved current and poten-
tial problems posed by separate or disjointed management of
stocks now shared with Canada. Thus, this alternative may be
viewed as a suboption of Alternative 3.

A limited agreement pending delimitation of the boundary
has advantages over reliance on simple consultations to ad-
dress present concerns regarding overfishing of fishery
stocks. An interim agreement could bind both governments to
whatever management arrangements could be agreed, as consul-
tations between governments would not do.

Hov/ever, recent experience since implementation of the
FCMA suggests that a regime less comprehensive than the
one established by the Agreement would not effectively
conserve the resources. As noted above, efforts to imple-
ment such an interim agreement in 1978 were unsuccessful.

- 50 -

III: AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

A. The Physi cal and Biolo gical Environment

The area encompassed by the proposed action
extends off the Atlantic coast from Cape Hatteras
to Newfoundland. Within this reqion, the waters lying
above the continental shelf and slope to approximately
the 100 fathom line are the most productive and imnortant
fishing areas. Relatively narrow at Cape Hatteras, the
shelf w'dens markedly to the north to form Georges Bank
(figure 2;. The Northeast Channel, a major break in
the shelf, divides Georges Bank from the Scotian Shelf
and connects the deeper portions of the Gulf of Maine
with the Atlantic. In the Gulf the shelf narrows consi-
derably, but northeast of the Channel off Nova Scotia it
widens again. Another major break occurs at the Laurentian
Valley, the deep channel between Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.
To the east and south of Newfoundland the shelf extends
to its greatest breadth, forming the Grand Banks.

The southern portion from Cape Hatteras to Georges Bank
is fairly uniform physically, with a continental shelf area
influenced by many large coastal rivers and estuaries and
incised by prominent shelf-edge canyons. Typically, the
bottom is sand interspersed with large pockets of sand-gravel
and sand-shell. Below 110 fathoms (200 meters, or m), the

CD

o

CO

i

§

J i

'-^

^

f 5

-6-

- 52 -

substrate becomes a mixture of silt, silt-sand, and clay-
As the continental slope deepens into the abyssal plain
at depths greater than 1000 fathoms (lR30m), clay predomi-
nates over silt and becomes the major substrate (MAFMC,
1978).

Unlike the more uniform southern portion, the shelf
area north of Georges Bank i^ characterized by many scat-
tered rises which comprisf the various fishing banks. The
estuarine influence of coastal rivers is absent, and there
are none of the canyon features which are typical to the
south. The northern portion is also characterized by colder
waters as the influence of the Gulf Stream current diminishes
^nd a colder current regime becomes more predominant.

The dominant current in the region is the Gulf Stream,
which forms a narrow river of v^arm water from the Gulf of
Mexico to the Northwest Atlantic (figure 4). In the spring,
a large circular flow of water around Georges Bank creates
the Georges Bank Eddy. The eddy dissipates in the fall,
when most water moves southerly over the Bank (Res. Inst.
G. Maine, 1974). A second eddy encompasses the entire
Gulf of Maine.

Distributional charts of commercially important species
are included in figures 5a through 5o . These charts indicate
that almost every such species is present in commercial

Figure 4

CANADA

38

Gulf of Maine-Georges Bank. Region

Surface Currents Within Slope Water
and Coastal Water Masses

(^

€>

^

70

Mercator Projection
Scale 1:5,700,000 at 42°N
Sounding lines in fathoms

64

53

- 54 -

q

uantities in both the U.S. and Canadian fishery zones.
The distributions are based on Grosslein and Clark
(1976), Gusey (1977), Hare (1977), 1974 R/V Albatross
survey cruises, and consultations with the NMFS Wood
Hole Laboratory and the Canadian Department of Fisheries
and Oceans.

These charts should no_t be assumed to show absolute
abundance or the relative abundance between the U.S. and
Canadian zones. Distributions and concentrations are
approximate and may vary from year to year due to
oceanoqraphic conditions. Narrative descriptions of
each species distribution are present in Appendix II.
A more thorough description of the affected physical
and biological environment is present in Appendix III.

B- Areas of Special Biological Importa nce

Colton, et al. (1979) summarized importance spawning
areas for many important fish on the Georges Bank, and in
the Gulf of Maine and Mid-Atlantic areas (Table I) . The
most productive grounds are: Georges Bank, Nantucket Shoals,
the Great South Channel, and the continental shelf from Cape
Hatteras to Block Island.

- 55 -

Table I. Principal Spawning Areas and Times of
Marine Fishes, Cape Sable to Cape Hatteras (Colton,
et al. , 1979) .

Species

Coffmon

Gulf , of fmne

■M

o| -

'l ijdie Atla n nc 9nnt

r '.,.

I Scombri dae
'Scorgaenidde

Tngl idae

Cottidae

;AjiTnodytidae
"Stroffidteidae

I Pleuronac-

, naae

Tautoqa om tis

Taucogolabrus

Seoastes

.annus

H/Qiocepnalus

ociodecem -
spinosus

Anmodytes sp.

■eprilus
tnacanthus

Ci thancnuivs

Hiopoqiossina

oplonga
Paraiicfithys

Glyptocephalu
cynoqlossus

iipjoqiossoides

piatessoiaes

Limanda

Pseudopleuro -
nectes
arr-encanus

cautog
cunner

Atlantic
mdckerel

northern
iearobin

longhorn
sculpin

sand lance
butterfisn

jj1f
Stream
flounder

fours pot
flounaer

flounder
Mindowoane

*itcri

flounder

American
plaice

yel loHtai 1
flounder

-inter
f 1 ounder

Mass. Bay
ijeorges
■Nant. Shoals -s

W. Gulf *<■
Cape.Cod Bay

Scotian Shelf i

Cent. Gulf

SW Georges
Nant. Shoals

SU Geor-jes
Nant. Shoals

Hant. Shoals-
South

iiariL. Shoals-
South

Georges Bank
;Jant. Shoals-
South

Georges Bank
Mant. Shoals-
South

>^eorges Sank

Caoe Cod-
Chesapeak Say

3!ocii Island-
Cape rtatteras

Cdoe .00-
3e' aware Bay

Soutn of
"artha ' s '^ ine-
yard

UL

Known spawning season.

Uncertain spawning season,

* Peak spawning.

- 56 -

Table I.

continued

Fami ly

Cofimon
Same

, 1ul,f iiif riairifi

A I M ■ ^ , , A S J 1 N 3

xMrtlP^a^Unrir qr.nt

M A M ^ I

rrr-T-T^

Engraulidae

Pomatomidie
t Scianldae

Clupea harenqus

narengus

Anchoa hepsetus

£nqrauli$

Encnelyoous
Gdflus morhua

•^glanoqrarnwus

aeqlefinuT

Merluceius
&i 1 inea'n s

Urophyds

Uropnycis chuss

Urophycis '•eqius

Urophyds tenuis

Ppmatomus

TjTTaTrTx
CelostiiTWi

Micropoqon

urnlu

ipoqon
ilaius

Cynosc^on

re calls

Atlantic
menhaden

Atlantic
herring

striped
anchovy

silver
anchovy

fourbeard

r-ockUng

Atlantic
cod

Western ^ova

Scotu

Jeffries Ledqe A
Stel Iwaqen Sank

Nantucket Shoals

cffsiiora

lake

silver
h?«e

pollock

long
finned
hake

spotted

hake

white hake
blyefish

Atlantic
croaker

Georqes Sank

Browns Sank
Nantucket Shoals

Georges Sank
Browns Sank
South Channel

;JE Georges i
Cent, Gulf

Southern
Georges

Mass. 8ay
StelUagen

South Channel

S. Georges
riant. Shoals

H. of ;ela*.are

Nant. Shoals-
ginia

NY eiqht-
C. Hatteras

Cont. Slope

Ches. Bay-
Cape ^latteras

Ches. 3av-
Cjoe Hatteras

Ches 8ay-
Montauk. Ll

Figure 5a

-" — TT

I 1

70

Argentine

Spring distribution

Fall distribution

Only the 100 fathom line is shown.
Mercator Projection

57

"^ — IT

-1 1 1 r

70

1
65

-[ 1 I r

Figure 5b

Spring distribution
Fall distribution
Concentrations

Only the 100 fathom line is shown,
Mercator Projection

-^^^

.>5 io ds

I I ■ ' 1 _l I I 1 1 J 1 1 L.

jI I I I L.

58

^ — 7;

Figure 5c

Spring distribution

;;;<] Fall distribution

Only the 100 fathom line is sho'vn-
Mercator Projection

J I I I 1 1 1 1 L.

59

-I 1 1 r

70

Figure 5d

-I T"

75

I I I 1 ' I I

65 60

Spring distribution
Fall distribution
I Concentrations

Only the 100 fathom line is shown.
Mercator Projection

Canada

60

"1 1 — X

T 1 r

65

Figure 5e

Red Hake

Spring distribution

Fall distribution

Only the 100 fathom line is shown.
Mercator Projection

Canada

61

-! \ r-

65

Silver Hake

Spring distribution
Fall distribution

Concentrations

Onlv the 100 fathom hne is shown
Mercator Projection

Canada

62

-I r

65

Figure 5g

70

White Hake

Spring distribution

Fall distribution

Only the 100 fathom line is sho^vn.
Mercator Projection

-J 1 I ' I I

63

Figure 5h

Atlantic Herring

Spring distribution
Fall distribution

I I Concentrations

^ Migrations

Only the 100 fathom line is shown
Mercator Projection

J I I L.

_i I u

64

IT

— I 1 r

70

— I 1 1 1 1 1 r

65 60

Figure 5i

Lobster

Spring distribution
Fall distribution
— ^- Migrations

Both inshore and offshore
stocks are shown

Only the 100 fathom line is showvn.
Mercator Projection

Canada

65

-1 r

— r-

70

1 r

I

65

Figure 5)

vZy/\ Spring distribution
^^^ Fall distribution
Concentrations

► Migrations

Only the 100 fathom line is shown.
Mercator Projection

Canada

' ' '

66

IT

1 1 1 r

65

Figure 5k

Spring distribution
Fall distribution
i Concentrations
— -*■ Spring migration

■^ Fall migration

Only the 100 fathom line is shown.
Mercator Projection

Canada

fc^-*

5 4o

■ \ I 1 1 J 1-

67

-1 1 r

70

-! 1 1 1 1 1—

65 60

Figure 51

Spring distribution
Fall distribution
Concentrations

Only the 1CX) fathom line is shown.
Mercator Projection

Canada

_i I I

J I I I J I 1 L.

68

^ — TT

Figure 5m

Spring distribution
Fall distribution
I Concentrations

Onlv the 1 00 fathom line is shown.
Marcator Projection

69

—r-

75

Figure 5n
—! T —

Loiigo Squid

Winter and Spring
distribution

Summer and Fall
distribution

Summer/Fall spawning

-^- Migrations

Only The 100 fathorn line is sho'vn
Mercator Projection

i I 1 L.

70

IT

-| 1 r

-~r

70

Figure 5o

lllex Squid

Winter and Spring
distribution

^ Summer and Fall
distribution

Migrations

Only the 100 fathom line is shown.
Mrcator Projection

' ' I I L.

71

- 72 -

Human Environment

The human environment that would be directly affected
by the proposed action through its ultimate impact on the
availability and price of fish consists primarily of fish
harvesters and processors located on the east coast of the
United States from Maine to Virginia. It also consists of
consumers throughout the nation. Likely impacts of the
proposed action are assessed in section IV(A)(3) of this
statement. In addition, individuals and organizations
dependent in whole or in part on the fishing industry would
be indirectly affected by the proposed action. These
individuals and organizations include, among others, those
involved in transporting fish and fish products,
constructing fishing vessels and processing plants,
supplying and outfitting fish harvesters and processors,
etc. Secondary or indirect impacts that may result from
the proposed action are not assessed herein because of the
speculative nature of such an assessment and the lack of
available data.

In response to Congressional inquiries, the Northeast
Regional Office of the National Marine Fisheries Service
prepared a document entitled "A Short Run Economic Impact

- 73 -

Analysis of the U . S . -Canad i an Agreement on East Coast
Fishery Resources" in June 1979. Parts I and II of that
document contain detailed information describing fish
harvesting and processing sectors that would be affected by
the proposed action.

The document is available on request from the
Director, Northeast Region, National Marine Fisheries
Service, NOAA, in Elm Street, Gloucester, Mass. 01930.

Appendix IV of this statement profiles commercial
fisheries in each state adjacent to areas of potential
Canadian access and key fisheries covered by the Agreement.
Recreational fisheries, which may account for a large
portion of U.S. landings of certain species, are not
described due to the lack of recent survey data.

- 74 -
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

A . Impact of the Proposed Action

1 . Physical Environirent

Under the Agreement, Canadian fishing vessels would
have access to limited areas of the U.S. fishery conserva-
tion zone (FCZ) to harvest the entitlements provided. With the
exception of access provided in the Loligo squid fishery,
Canadian vessels would be confined to former ICNAF Subarea
5, principally Subdivision 5Ze and, to a lesser extent.
Division 5Y (see figure 2,'. They would not be permitted
to fish within 12 miles of the U.S. coast. It should be
noted that Canadian fishing vessels currently have access
to a significant portion of Subdivision 5Ze by virtue of
the overlapping boundary claims on Georges Bank.

The proposed action would generate two categories of
impacts on the physical environment, one related to the
presence of Canadian fishing vessels in part of the U.S.
zone, and the other related to the act of fishing. The
presence of Canadian vessels within the FCZ carries with it
the potential for certain hazards such as collisions with
other vessels and marine pollution. These potential

- 75 -

hazards exist whenever vessels of any nationality transit
or fish in the U.S. FCZ. Compliance with the International
Regulations for preventing Collisions at Sea (1972) , which
have been incorporated into the domestic law of both
countries, should minimize the potential for collision.

The problem of marine pollution by fishing vessels in
the FCZ is not addressed in U.S. law. Nevertheless, pollu-
tion from these sources is considerably less threatening to
the physical environment than marine pollution caused by
larger vessels, particularly oil tankers.

Potential impacts on the physical environment
associated with the act of trawling or dredging by Canadian
vessels under the Agreement include: gear conflicts with
other fishermen, damage to marine structures such as under-
sea communication cables, and disruption of sediments and
bottom dwelling marine life. These potential impacts may
also result from the activities of other foreign fishing
vessels that presently fish in the FCZ under Governing
International Fishery Agreements, as well as from the acti-
vities of our expanding domestic fleet.

Although access granted to Canadian vessels would be
confined as noted, it would be on terms more liberal than
those applicable to other foreign vessels fishing in the

- 76 -

FCZ. The activities of those other vessels are governed by
the U.S. foreign fishing regulations; the activities of
Canadian vessels would be governed by the Agreement provi-
sions and by regulations applicable to U.S. vessels except
in the Loligo squid fishery. In that fishery, Canadian
vessels would have access for 10 years on terms more
restrictive than those governing U.S. vessels, but somewhat
less restrictive than those governing other foreign vessels,
Most likely, Canadian vessels in the Lol igo squid fishery
would be confined to the approximate areas of the present
foreign fishing areas off the Mid-Atlantic states.

Thus, although gear conflicts and damage to marine
structures may be no greater as the result of Canadian
access than as the result of access granted an equivalent
number of other foreign vessels, it is possible such
problems may arise over a broader area of the FCZ. To
mitigate gear conflict problems, the Agreement calls for
the establishment of gear avoidance regulations that would
apply equally to U.S. and Canadian fishermen. In addition,
potential damage to marine structures can be minimized by
adequate notice of their location and through regulations
concerning authorized fishing.

Disruption to continental shelf sediments and bottom
dwelling marine life from the use of bottom trawls and

- 77 -

riiedqes in certain fisheries can be ininimi zed , if necessary,
by qear requlations. The specific environmental effects of
tiie use of such gear are more appropriately the focus of
the specific r.anaqei.ient plans for the various fisheries
under the Aarecrr.ent.

The potential in pacts of all of the above can be
discounter; to some extent by the number of U.Ii. vessels
that vvould leave the l;.S. zone to fish once aqain in areas
Lnder undisputed Canadian fisheries jurisdiction. In 1977,

more than 100 U.S. fishing vessels reported operatind during
some part of the year in the Canadian zone. Since June 1978,
these vessels have been confined to the U.S. zone, increasing
the potential for impacts on the physical environment of
the U.S. zone such as those described. Under the Agreement,
it is anticipated that some, if not all, of these vessels
again would operate in the Canadian zone.

2 . Biological Environment

The proposed action would create a framework within
which the United States and Canada would be able to coordi-
nate fishery management, decisions for stocks of mutual

- 7i

interest. The Aqroeinent itself Flakes few irananenent
decisions regarding these resources. It requires that
total allowable catches be established annually based on
the best scientific information available. It vests one
country, the otlier, or both v;i th exclusive or frinaiy
manaqoment responsibility for each stock covered. And it
contains percentaoe shares to be a[ plied to the annual
tag's to deterr.ine the amount each country n^.ay fish.

Beyond these basic provisior\s, the Agreement leaves
the development of specific m:anageinent programs to the
country v.ith exclusive or primary management responsibility,
or to tioth countries in the case of four stocks. These
proqrajTis v/ould be developed in accordance with the Agree-
ment's managem.ent principles which are patterned after the
national standards for fishery management contained in the
Fishery Conservation and ^.anagement Act of 1976. In the
case of stocks managed p^rimarily by one country and those
managed jointly, the Aoreement provides for dispute resolu-
tion to guard agairist the possibility that deadlock may
leave the stocks unprotected.

The impact of this management framework on the
biological environment v\ould be beneficial. Currently, the
United States and Canada undertake independently to manage
many stocks fished by both. For some, one country has

- 79 -

iir piemen ted a raanageiront " j^rogt erni v;hilt the othei tias riOt.
For otiiets, neithei" country has yet developed inanaqenent
prograiT'S. )-ccause neitlier countiy is b(5und by the reriula-
tions oC the othei:, neither is able to establish TAC's. £or
the stock?-. Instead, each now establishes TAG ' s only for its
own fishermen. Even vvhere both countries seen' to agree on
annual TAC s , they often disagree on the airiount each is
entitled to take. The result in several instances has been
actual catches that t.Kceed the totals both believe are
sound .

The Agreement would substitute a single TAC for TAC ' s
adopted independently, and would require an annual TAC for
each stock covered. Ihe entitlement [letcentage shares
would resolve differences over what each country may take.
Thus, risks of overfishing would be diminished, and stock
rebuilding efforts v.ould have a reasonable opportunity to
achieve the desired ends. Most importantly, the Agreement
would assure that pressure to m.axim.ize short term uses of
these resources will not be allowed to threaten long term
product i vity .

Fishery resources' can be managed v/ith various goals
in mind. For instance, the ^:id-Atlantic Fishery Management
Council is attempting to create significant future oppor-
tunities for recreational fishermen in the Atlantic

mackerel fishery. The optimum yield established in the
Council's Atlantic mackerel plan reflects this decision by
restricting current uses. Gn the other hand, the New
England Council is attempting to tebuild cod and haddock
stocks depleted in the past by overfishing, while mini-
mizinq current economic dislocation among those dependent
on these fisheries. As a result, the OY's established seek
to balance these goals.

A problem which both Councils now face, however, is
that Canadian fishermen who fish the same stocks are under
no obligation to observe the management measures adopted.
The Councils' goals thus may or may not be realized. The
Agreement would require that fishermen of both countries
observe the m.anagement measures adopted for each stock.

Under the Agreement the United States would have
exclusive or primary management responsibility for all
Georges Bank stocks except argentine, scallops (precise
the Great South Channel), and cusk. Atlantic mackerel
(TAG only), lobster (only in the boundary region, and only
pending delimitation of the boundary), pollock and Georges
Bank cusk would be managed jointly. The Agreement thus
would not only provide for coordinated management, but
would give the United States the exclusive or predominant
say in how the majority of stocks in the U.S. zone are

!1 -

managed. buch a mariaqement role would be significantly
qi cater than that the United States now enjoys since, at
the present, its management decisions for the majority of
these stocks can be ignored by Canadian fishermen.

Specific n.anaqeinent programs developed for stocks in
the Aqieerent will impact the biological environment most
directly. As mentioned, however, these programs would be
adopted in accordance v/ith the Agreement's m.anaqement
principles only after it has entered into force. The
Agreeii'ent ' s principal impact v/ould be its assurance that
tag's v;ill be established, that both countries will be
entitled to a certain percentage share, and that disagree-
ments over management m.easures will not leave the stocks
unprotected .

The United States and Canada have both experienced
the "tragedy of the commons" when important stocks of fish
were available to all and pressure to maximize current uses
was intense. In the 1960 's and 1970 's, attempts at fish-
eries management were made by the International Commission
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) and through
various bilateral agreements. Despite these efforts,
stocks in the Georges Bank-Gulf of Maine area declined.
Countries pat tic ipat ing in the fisheries v/ere unwilling to
accept adequate restraint in the short term to assure long

- 82 -

term productivity. TAC's v.-ore set tcjo high tor certain
species anr' not set at all for others. Tn addition, TAG ' s
set for individual species did net alv/ays take sufficient
account of tlie L^ycatch of those soecies taken incidentally
ir directed fisheties tor other species.

Ixperience under ICNAF reflects the har^'-ful impacts
that can flow frcin il) intense corrpe tit ion among countries
for shares of United resources, (2) too i^uch: emphasis on
current uses of fishery resources at the expense of future
uses, and (3) inadequate or incomplete panacen'ent systeirs.
After extendinq their jurisdiction over fisheries to
prevent further depletion of these resources, the United
States and Canada now rnust agree on how shared resources
are to be conserved and r.ianaged lest they repeat the
" tragedy of the commons". The proposed action would provide
principles and procedures for doina so.

Because fisheries ranagement is a dynai^ic process,
it must have the flexibility tc resfx^nd to changes in the
biological status of the stocks and to profit from
increased scientific knowledge. The Agreement provides in
Article VII for anending annual management measures for
Cateqory A stocks (those jointly managed) and Category B
stocks (those where one country or the other has prim.ary
management responsibility). buch amendments could be

- 83 -

implemented rapidly if, in light of unforeseen circum-
stances, a stock is threatened with serious and immediate
harm, or if there is an economic emergency in a fishery
that can be alleviated without significant adverse effects
on the conservation of the stock. Management measures for
Category C stocks (those managed exclusively by one country
or the other) could be amended at any time by the country
with exclusive management authority.

Tl-e Aqr f tner t ' 3 mandqeaient principles require that
annual rfanaqoinerit measures be based on the best scientitic
information available. This requirement v;ill assure that
the countries profit trom increased scientific knowledge
of the fisheries. In addition, tliese principles require
that rr.anagoment measures take into account demonstrated
degrees of stock and species interrelationships. This
requireiTient would assure that the countries consider
n^ananement measures not only in terms of their effect on a
qiven stock, but on the relationship between that stock
and the ecosystem, of which it forms a part. Should our
expanding knov/ledge of such relationships increase to a
point enabling the countries to implement entirely new
manaqement strc^tegies, they would be able to do so by
agreement at any time.

!4 -

The Ar!reerr:ent recognizes the need for flexibility
to encouraqe innovative nianaqerrent techniques. For
instance, r.anaqemcnt measures listed in Article XI, para-
qraph 2, that may be adopted tor Category A and B stocks
are permissive rather than obligatory. Article VIII
specifically provides that the Parties may amend any pro-
vision of the Annexes by agreement. It also allows the
Con;mission to recom.mend such amendments to the Parties,
including without limitation, the addition or deletion of
stocks, the transfer of stocks from one Annex to another,
and changes in fishing entitlements and access areas. If
the tine limits or other administrative procedures set
forth in the Agreement prove unsatisfactory, either Party
may request a review and reneqot iat ion of such provisions
after an initial 5-year period following entry into force
of the Agreement.

The m.anageiT.ent categories established in the Agree-
ment would provide for graduated degrees of interaction
betV7een the countries in nianaging fishery resources.
Stocks appear in one category or another based on a number
of factors. These include the degree to which a given
stock, based on seasonal m.igration patterns, is found in
the fishery conservation zone of one country or the other,
how much interaction there appears to be between stocks,

- 85 -

where spawning grounds are located, and the degree to
which fishermen of one country or the other have fished
traditionally for a given stock. No set formula can be
applied.

Where possible, to facilitate management and to avoid
the potential for disagreement as to conservation goals ,
stocks would be managed exclusively or primarily by one
country or the other. Thus, for example, Atlantic cod in
Division 5Y as well as Atlantic cod in Division 4W and
Subdivision 4Vs are listed in Category C. Cod in these
areas are basically localized. They can thus be managed
as a unit in each of the two areas (Division 5Y and area
4VSW) independently. Although fishermen of the two coun-
tries have operated for cod in both areas, the Parties
agreed in the context of the negotiations to limit their
entitlem.ent shares in each other's zone to very low per-
centages (less than two percent in each case) . Thus,
because cod stocks in these areas do not range significantly
beyond them, because fishery management jurisdiction is
not disputed, and because fishermen of each country would
have limited interests in the zone of the other, management
of these stocks need not involve a significant degree of
coordination between the Parties.

!6 -

On tt)e ether hand, cod in Division 5:!, though
relatively localised, is accessible to fishermen of both
countries in thG boundary region on Georqes Bank. This
factor , coupled with the interest of both countries in the
5Z cod stock as deivonstr ated by their past catches and as
reflected in tlieir entitlenent shares, can be seen to
recuire some rianaqeinent coordination LetVi^een therr . bnder
the Aqreeriient, th.e 5Z cod stock is listed undei Category b.
The United States would have primary manageiTient responsi-
bility for this stock. The bnited states would thus
develop nanageiueiit neasures tor tlie ^Z cod stock in
accordance with the Agreenent's iTianagenent principles.
Canada vould be able to object to the nanaqement measures
adopted by the United States, but would be required to
demonstrate that those measures are clearly inconsistent
with the Agreement's manager.ient principles for them to be
mod i f ied .

Category A procedures would involve the greatest
deqree of management cooperation between the two countries.
These procedures would apply in whole or in part to those
stocks in which both countries have significant interests.
For instance, although most Atlantic mackerel winter off
the U.S. coast in Areas 5 ana 6, a large number miigrate to
the Canadian zone in sum.mer to spawn. The fishing pressure

- 87 -

appliec! by eithei" country to this species v.'itliin its
exclusive fishery zone may allect it throughout its migra-
tory range. Proper n^.anaaernent of Atlantic mackerel in
Areas 3, 4, 5, and G can thus be seen to require a joint
effort of the Parties. Unoer the /Agreement, fishermen of
each country Vvould be authorized to harvest mackerel only
in that country's zone, but both countries v-ouici agree in
the Commission on the annual TAG for all four areas.

Another example is that of cusk in Subdivision 5Ze.
Unlike mackerel, this stock is not thouaht to range signi-
ficantly betv/een the undisputed fishery zones of the tvvo
countries. This factor alone might be thought to suggest
that cusk in 5Ze should be managed according to Category
E procedures. E^ut cusk in this area is currently available
to fishermen of both countries in the boundary region and
Canada's annual harvests of cusk in Subdivision 5Ze have
been substantially greater over time than those of the
United States. This is reflected in the countries'
entitlement shares (Canada G6 percent; United States 34
percent). In balancing their interests in this stock,
the Parties agreed that Category A procedures should govern
the management of cusk in 5Ze.

Regardless of the specific category in v/hich a stock
appears, the Agreement, as mentioned, recognizes that

- 88 -

experience may demonstrate another category would be more
appropriate to effective management of that stock. The
countries would be able to vary them at any time by agree-
ment, and the Commission would also be able to recommend
am.endments .

The proposed action represents some departure from
traditional bilateral fishery agreem.ents with their limited
management goals and lim.ited contributions to conservation.
It would establish a comprehensive system for conserving a
broad range of fishery resources. It v/ould have the
flexibility necessary to evolve with increased scientific
knowledge and developing theories of m.anagement. Above
all, it would encourage long term resource productivity.

- 89 -

3 . The Human Environment
a. Introduction

In enacting the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976 Congress created a national program of conser-
vation and management intended to realize the full potential
of the Nation's fishery resources. Eight Regional Fishery
Management Councils were created to develop and implement
management plans for regional fisheries within the U.S.
fishery conservation zone. The New England and Mid-Atlantic
Councils, however, are placed in the difficult position of
imposing restraints on U.S. fishermen in the interest of
sound management, while having no control over Canadian
fishermen fishing the same stocks. The Agreement seeks to
resolve this problem by providing for coordinated manage-
ment of the stocks in which both countries have an economic
interest, consistent with the management principles of the
FCMA, and with the full participation of the Regional
Councils.

With or without an agreement, efforts to manage or
rebuild fully or over-exploited stocks would involve some
degree of socio-economic dislocation. Effective stock
management may require temporarily lower catch levels for
some stocks than those of recent years, while others may
be increased. One or both countries may thus experience

- 90 -

temporary socio-economic dislocations. Without an Agreement
each country would be expected to act to minimize its own
losses, and the result could be a combined rate of harvest
higher than that which either side would individually
recommend. Socio-economic dislocation in the present may
thus be minimized, but only at the expense of future oppor-
tunities. If both countries instead mutually agree to a
rate of total harvest, both short-term impacts and long-
term economic benefits will be shared. As described m
detail in the following sections, the full potential of
the fishery resource is much more likely to be realized,
and overall socio-economic benefit to both Nations is
expected to be greater in the long-term with the Agreement
than without it.

The proposed action would have both short-term and
long-term impacts on the human environment, some of which
can be quantified reliably while others cannot. For example,
in 1977, the last full year of reciprocal fishing, more
than 100 U.S. vessels reported operating all or part of the
year in the Canadian zone. Since June 1978 Canada has
excluded them. The proposed action would enable U.S.
vessels to resume operations in the Canadian zone to con-
tinue traditional fisheries. In 1980 the value of this
access to U.S. harvesters is estimated at $5.1 million.

- 91 -

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TABLE II - (cont'd)

- 93 -

V Subject to change as new information becomes available.

y CAFSAC=Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Assessment Committee.

y Constant recruitment is defined as a constant, average number of
new recruits to the fish stock becoming available to the fishery
each year. Even though the actual number may vary from year to
year around this value, the long-term average v/culd be maintained.
Fq ^ is that level of fishing at which the estimated increase in
total catch that would be produced by adding an additional unit of
fishing effort is lO percent of the increase produced by adding
the same unit of fishing effort to the fishery during its
initial phases of exploitation. (Fishing at Fq_^ may not produce
the maximum possible yield in any particular year, but it reduces
the risk of overfishing and stock depletion due to unexpected
declines in recruitment- of young fish to a stock or other unforseen
developments. )

4/ MSY=Maximum sustainable yield.
5/ TAC=Total allowable catch.

^— Subiru fteuneary

CANADA

2:»J 3.79 STATEIBCE)

- 94 -

based on projected short term total allowable catches (TAC's)
and 1978 U.S. average ex-vessel prices.

Although Canadian vessels would also regain access to
the U.S. zone, the value of that access is more difficult to
assess since, with the exception of Loligo squid, Canadian
vessels currently have access to all species covered by the
A.greeraent, either in the Canadian zone or in the boundary
region on Georges Bank.

Other cautions concerning the reliability of available
data, its completeness, or problems with quantification and
forecast techniques are contained in the text or in the
footnotes to the tables, and should be carefully noted,
b. Short Term Impacts

Short term impacts, both positive and negative, would
result primarily from changes in the supply of fish available
to harvesters from the stocks covered. Processor and con-
sumers would also be affected by the proposed action's effect
on supply, but to a lesser extent than harvesters because of
greater substitution possibilities. The proposed action
would affect short term supply by requiring that the Councils
or the Commission establish total allowable catches (TAC's)
annually for each stock, and by requiring that each country
fish only up to its entitlement percentage share. To evaluate
the potential impact of these requirements on supply two com-
parisons are helpful (1) whether the recent total catch from

- 95 -

a given stock is above or below the potential long term annual
average yield, and (2) whether the recent U.S. catch is more or
less than the share that would be available to the United
States under its entitlement.

The comparison between the recent total catch and the
potential annual average indicates whether a stock is being
exploited above or below the level thought consistent with
long term resource productivity. If above, long term produc-
tivity may or may not be threatened depending on the extent
of the overage and the length of time catches at such levels
are sustained.

The potential annual yield from the stock represents an
average that in any given year or years can be exceeded to
some extent, provided the average in the long term is main-
tained. Nevertheless, where the recent total catch is signif-
icantly above the potential annual average, the TAG under
the proposed action might be established at a level lower
than the recent total catch in the interest of resource
conservation. This action would reduce the supply available
to all harvesters in the short term without reference to
entitlements. Where the .recent catch from a stock is lower
than the potential annual average, opportunities exist for
expansion. In some cases this expansion could take place
rapidly simply by increasing effort; in others, however,
particularly where stock abundance has been affected by past

- 96 -

overfishing, expansion would be more gradual to allow for
stock rebuilding.

The comparison between recent U.S. catch and the share
of the recent total that would be available to the United
States under its entitlement offers a rough approximation of
whether U.S. harvesters would be likely to benefit from or
be adversely affected by the proposed action in the short
term. This second comparison must be made in conjunction with
the first since it is not accurate in all cases to assme that
tag's under the proposed action could or would be set at the
level of recent total catches, as mentioned.

Table III makes both comparisns for each stock covered
by the proposed action with the exception of offshore lobster
in Subdivision 5Ze (discussed with Other Fisheries).

Table III demonstrates that short term supplies available
to harvesters are unlikely to be affected by the proposed
action for the majority of stocks covered. In most cases,
the shares available to the United States would be somewhat
greater under the proposed action than recent U.S. shares
of the total catch from the stocks.

For five stocks, however, this is not the case. These
are: scallops in 5Ze, pollock in 4VWX+5, redf ish in 5, cusk
in 5Ze, and white hake in 5. Three of these stocks, 5Ze
scallops, 4VWX+5 pollock, and 5 white hake were exploited in
1978 at levels above the potential annual average. Overages

- 97 -

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- 99 -

ranged from slight in the case of pollock and white hake to
significant in the case of scallops. Thus, the potential
decrease below the 1978 U.S. catch could be more substantial
in the short term than that shown in the table if conserva-
tion requirements under the proposed action resulted in a
TAG less than the recent total catch in these fisheries.

The potential decrease in supply available to U.S.
harvesters of white hake in 5 could be recouped by an increase
in the supply of white hake available to them in 4VWX. The
decrease in the redfish supply available from Area 5 would
also be more than offset by corresponding increases in the
redfish supply available to the U.S. in areas 4VWX , 4RST,
and 3-0. The potential decrease in the supply of 5Ze cusk
(100 tons) could be offset somewhat if the TAG for cusk were
set at, rather than below the potential annual average level.
There is no indication that management concerns would preclude
doing so.

Significant decreases that would not be offset by
increases elsewhere would be likely only for scallops in 5Ze
and pollock in 4VWX+5. It is difficult to determine whether
the potential decrease in the pollock fishery would be as
substantial as that shown, however, since U.S. pollock land-
ings in 1978 may have been augmented to some extent by
misreported catches of other species.

- 100 -

Pollock Fishery

Pollock are generally harvested by mobile otter trawl
gear, by gillnets, and by line trawls. In 1977, some 600
vessels landing fish in New England ports reported using
otter trawls. Sixty-three vessels reported using gillnets
while 23 reported using line trawls. The average vessel in
the current otter trawl fleet was built 26 years ago, has
an average of 66 gross registered tons, and carries a crew
of four. The average gillnetter and line trawler are con-
siderably smaller (45 and 23 GRT respectively) and younger
(18 and 19 yeras old respectively) and carry smaller crews
(usually 3). In 1977 pollock landings accounted for 3.2
percent of the total revenues to otter trawlers in New
England. By port, only in Gloucester and Boston did landings
of pollock by otter trawlers exceed 3 percent of total
revenues (6.5 percent in Gloucester; 10.2 percent in Boston).

In comparison, 1977 pollock landings accounted for 34.4
percent of total revenues to gillnetters in New England.
Three- fourths of the gillnetters active in 1977 landed their
catches in Maine ports. In York County and in Portland and
Portland County pollock landings accounted for about 30
percent of total revenues in 1977. In Massachusetts, in
Gloucester and on the South Shore pollock landings accounted
for 20.2 percent and 12.5 percent of total revenues to
gillnetters in 1977.

- 101 -

In addition to otter trawlers, gillnetters and line
trawlers, an unknown number of small "under tonnage" vessels
(vessels which carry no Guard documentation) account for
between 15 and 20 percent of pollock landings. These vessels
predominantly use line travels (62.4 percent) and gillnets
(22.3 percent).

Processors of domestic origin pollock are located
primarily in Maine and Massachusetts. Most process a variety
of other fresh fish species in addition to pollock. Many are
relatively small, labor-intensive, family-type establishments,
NMFS unpublished data for 1976 indicate that 53 New England
plants processed some quantity of pollock. The majority of
these (37) produced fresh raw fillets. The next largest
number (9) produced frozen raw fillets.

The impact on harvesters and processors of a potential
reduction in the supply of 4VWX+5 pollock depends on (1) the
extent of the reduction, and (2) their ability to substitute
other species or other sources for pollock supplies from
4VWX+5 at current levels. The impact on otter trawlers
would be less significant than the impact on gillnetters or
line trawlers since otter trawlers, except perhaps in
Gloucester and Boston, harvest pollock largely as a bycatch
in other groundfish fisheries. Otter trawlers in this sense
would be affected primarily by any bycatch limits introduced.
Gillnetters and line trawlers, on the other hand, might have

- 102 -

to shift some effort to other fisheries. Opportunities
would seem to exist for doing so, particularly in the red
hake fishery although market incentives are not as great.

Processors would have two possible options if faced
with reduced supplies of 4VWX+5 pollock. (1) process other
species, or (2) obtain raw materials from other sources,
probably imports. If raw materials were obtained from
imports, processors would probably find it necessary to
change the product forms produced from raw fillets fresh
and frozen to sticks and portions. Currently U.S. proces-
sors who produce sticks and portions rely almost entirely
on imports of frozen blocks and slabs. This alternative
would be available to the larger processors but would
probably not be available to the smaller, family-type
establishments.
Scallop Fishery

The traditional scallop vessel is equipped with two iron
dredges that are dragged across the bottom simultaneously
brought up one at a time and dumped on deck. Scallops are
usually shucked on board where the edible adducter muscles
or "meats" are washed, packed in 40-pound bags, and iced.
The remaining shells, undersized scallops and viscera are
discarded overboard. In addition to these "traditional"
vessels, numerous smaller vessels use commercial trawls to
harvest scallops. Many keep the whole scallop and unload

- 103 -

at ports equipped to shuck on land. Very small scallops
are often processed in this kind of operation.

The traditional Nevv Bedford type scalloper is between
70 and 100 feet long and averages about 149 GRT, although
the trend is toward larger vessels. It carries a crew of
9 to 11 and makes 20 to 25 trips per year, each averaging
between 8 and 10 days.

In recent years the fishery has taken place in two
areas: tlie Mid-Atlantic grounds off New Jersey and on Georges
Bank. On Georges Bank itself, two areas have been important
scallop grounds: south western and the northeast parts of
the Bank.

U.S. fishermen developed the Georges Bank scallop
fishery well before the Second World War. Canadian fisher-
men began scalloping on Georges Bank about 1951, although
the United States dominated the fishery until 1965. About
that time, many U.S. scallopers shifted their effort to
the newly discovered Mid-Atlantic grounds.

The U.S. scallop fleet is divided between New England
based vessels and vessels based in the Mid-Atlantic area and
south to North Carolina. New England vessels accounted for
67 percent of U.S. landings in the period 1975-77. Of this
amount, 65 percent was harvested by dredgers while about
2 percent was harvested by otter trawlers. In the same
period, Mid-Atlantic vessels accounted for 33 percent of U.S.

- 104 -

landings of which 20 percent was harvested by dredgers while
13 percent was harvested by "netters".

In the 1975-77 period, 36 percent of the U.S. catch came
from the two areas on Georges Bank while 64 percent came from
the Mid-Atlantic grounds. New England based vessels accounted
for 100 percent of the Georges Bank catch and 48 percent of
the Mid-Atlantic catch.

The proposed action would extend only to the Georges
Bank scallop fishery. The Mid-Atlantic fishery is beyond the
scope of the Agreement and will be managed exclusively by
the United States in accordance with any fishery management
plan developed by the Fishery Management Councils.

Nevertheless, because the Georges Bank scallop fishery
yields a significant percentage of total U.S. scallop land-
ings, any decrease in the supply of scallops available to
U.S. harvesters in the Georges Bank scallop fishery would
have a significant impact on the human environment, particu-
larly on New England based scallop dredge operators.

Such a potential decrease would also be significant in
view of recent information concerning scallop abundance in
the Mid-Atlantic area and on the western side of Georges
Bank. The 1978 scallop assessment prepared by the NMFS

Northeast Fisheries Center indicated that for the
intermediate period ahead scallop abundance in these areas
could be expected to decline as the strong 1972 year-class

- 105 -

was fished out since no strong year-classes had recruited in
these areas. Preliminary 1979 data support that conclusion.

Recent higli yields have been the result of a single
good year-class (1972) which was observed throughout the
three principal areas in which the scallop fishery is conducted;
i.e., the Mid-Atlantic, the Georges Bank, and the Northern
Part on Georges Bank. As mentioned, recruitment prospects
now are poor in the Mid-Atlantic and Great South Channel
areas. Even if a good year-class materialized in these
areas, it would require about three years to develop to a
harvestable stage.

Also significant is the fact that many new vessels have
entered the scallop fishery in recent years, probably in
response to the dramatic increase in the price of scallops.
In 1974, 34 U.S. vessels reported dredging for scallops;
by 1977 that number had risen to 155.

Under the proposed action, U.S. scallopers would face
a significant decrease in the supply of scallops available
to them on Georges Bank, as shown in the table, even if the
total catch at the 197B level could be maintained. The
nine percent increase in the U.S. 1979 total Georges Bank
scallop catch over 1978 was the result of a 45 percent
increase in effort, as shown in Figure 6. Further concen-
trations of U.S. effort in the northeastern part of Georges
Bank combined with continued Canadian effort at current

Figure 6

11000 -,

10000-

9000

8000

7000-

6000

5000-

4000-

3000-

2000-

1000-

75

CPUE
(MT/DAY FISHED)

75 76 77 78 79

^

76

' EFFORT
(DAYS FISHED)

CATCH
(METRIC TONS)

I
77

78

I
79 YEAR

U.S. SEA SCALLOP CATCH, EFFORT,

AND CATCH PER UNIT EFFORT (CPUE)

Subdivision 5Ze

Data source: NOAA/NMFS, Northeast Fisheries Center. 1979 Data provisional. 3668 3-80 STATE( RGE)

106

- 107 -

levels may exceed the levesl conducive to recovery of the
scallop stock in the short term, and may also have more
far-reaching adverse effects than have thus far been
realized.

The impact of a decrease in the scallop supply available
to U.S. harvesters on Georges Bank would primarily affect
scallopers in Massachusetts ports, particularly the larger
vessels (over 125 GRT) in New Bedford and Provincetown ,
medium size vessels (61-125 GRT) in New Bedford and Sandwich,
and smaller vessels (less than 60 GRT) in New Bedford,
provincetown. Sandwich, and Barnstable and Dukes Counties.

Conversion of such vessels for operations in other
fisheries would be a possibility, but not without substantial
costs. It is estimated, for example, that the cost of con-
verting a large scallop vessel could run as much as $100,000.

Since most scallops harvested in Subdivision 5Ze are
processed at sea, a reduction in the available supply from this
area would have little impact on land based processors. Consu-
mers could be affected by a possible increase in the price of
scallops, although supply would probably not be affected
because of import possibilities.
Other Fisheries

Because of 1978 total catches in certain other fisheries
exceeded the estimated potential annual average yield and
there is sufficient price incentive to maintain catches at

- 108 -

those levels, it is possible that management decisions taken
under the proposed action would impose certain restraints in
the interest of long-terra productivity. This would decrease
supplies available to harvesters in these fisheries as well.
Four such stocks can be identified frora the table: herring
in 5Y, cod in 4VsW and 5Y , and haddock in 4X.

Whether or not such decisions are made would depend on
the social, economic and other relevant considerations taken
into account in the decision-making process. Decisions with
respect to herring and cod in 5Y in any event would be made
by the United States; those with respect to cod in 4VsW and
haddock in 4X would be made by Canada.

With respect to other species, access to the U.S. zone
would enable Canadian vessels to operate over a broader area
but, as mentioned, the value of that access except in the
Loligo fishery cannot readily be determined since those
vessels could approximate or exceed their entitlements in
the absence of the Agreement by increasing their effort in
the boundary region or in the Canadian zone.
Loligo Fishery

In 1980, the value of Loligo squid that would be avail-
able to Canada in the U.S. zone is estimated at $3.9 million.
(Based on the average ex-vessel U.S. price of Loligo squid
squid in 1979, as used to assess poundage fees paid by
foreign vessels operating in the U.S. zone in 1980.) However,

- 109 -

this direct benefit to Canada does not equate to a direct
cost to the United States, since 70 percent of the Loligo
squid in the U.S. zone is currently surplus to estimated
U.S. harvesting capacity. In 1978 U.S. fishermen harvested
640 tons of squid, although the optimum yield was established
at 44,000 tons. In 1979 Loligo squid, worth approximately
$29.8 million was made available for harvest by foreign
nations other than Canada in the U.S. zone. Based either on
actual or estimated U.S. harvests, there is substantial room
for U.S. fishermen to expand in this fishery even with
Canada's 10-year 9 percent entitlement under the Agreement.

While the United States eventually may harvest 91
percent of the Loligo squid in its zone and be in a position
to export some 40,000 tons annually, it is unliKely Canada,
with 9 percent or 3,960 tons, will affect either the world
price or the ability of U.S fishermen to market their catches
overseas. Although Canada has considerable Illex squid in
its zone, differences in price commanded by the two species
suggest that Illex is less preferred than Loligo and that
it may not be a direct substitute in the market place.
Lobster

Data with respect to lobster catches in area 5Ze are
incomplete since many lobsters are caught in trawling
operations, as opposed to those caught by means of fixed
gear, are not reported. As a result, available data from

- 110 -

this offshore fishery do not adequately reflect actual
catches. Until the maritime boundary is established the
Agreement provides that fisherm.en of each country may fish
for lobster in the disputed portion of Subdivision 5Ze with
no expansion of their directed fisheries for this stock. Thus,
since available supply would be maintained at recent levels,
no adverse impact is likely to result in the short term from
the proposed action.

It should also be noted that, based on 1977 figures*, the
fishery resources affected by the Agreement**, in relation to
all fishery resources, comprise not more than ten percent of
the fish landed and ten percent of the total value of the
fisheries in the New England and Mid-Atlantic States. (See
figure 7) .

*The m.ost recent year for which state-by-state statistics
are available.
**''Other Groundfish" are not included as "species affected"'
by the Agreement because the U.S. entitlement is 99% and
the U.S. has exclusive management authority for this cate-
gory in the U.S. zone.

Figure 7

PERCENTAGE OF SPECIES AFFECTED BY THE AGREEMENT*
RELATIVE TO TOTAL 1977 LANDINGS AND VALUE BY STATE

Total Landingi in Thousands of Pounds

Total Value in Thousands of 1977 U.S. Dollars

I

^ Parcent Subi«ct
^ To Trsatv

£^

-60 S

o

/

^

/

•"Other Groundfish" are not shown as species affecied by the Agreement because the U.S. entitlement is 99%
and the U.S. has exclusive management authority *or this category in the U.S. zone.

Data source: U.S. Department of Commerce, NOAA, NMFS Fisheries of the United States 1978, Current
Fisheries Statistics No 7800. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979.

Tabulation: NMFS Statistics Branch NE.

3660 3-80 STATE(RGE)

- 112 -

c. Long Term Impacts

Assessing the long term socio-economic impacts likely
to result from the proposed action is difficult since the
Agreement does not establish specific socio-economic policies.
Rather, it seeks to create a framework within which effective
management of living resources can take place. The implemen-
tation of management policy will be the on-going responsibility
of both Parties, either through their respective fisheries
management authorities in the case exclusive and primary
management responsibility (Categories C and B) , or through
the Commission in the case of joint management (Category A),
consistent with the provisions of the Agreement. The future
decisions and actions of these authorities are impossible to
predict, since they are likely to be affected by social and
economic factors and future events unknowable at present.

Biological analyses in fisheries management simply
establish underlying resource productivity. Normally that
productivity will support a range of management alternatives.
Within the range economic, social, and other human considera-
tions will determine the most acceptable or desirable
combination of current and future uses. For example, with
respect to depleted stocks, rebuilding efforts can be under-
taken at various rates of speed. They can be maximized as
the Regional Councils are attempting to do in the case of
Atlantic mackerel and Georges Bank herring, or effected more

- 113 -

gradually as the TJew England Council has chosen to do in the
case of Atlantic groundfish. Thus, specific harvest levels
in any given year depend not only on the biological status
of the stocks but also on management decisions made in
light of social and economic circumstances.

Since it is impossible to predict exactly which combi-
nation of alternative management decisions will be implemented
in the future, particularly in the long term, a precise
valuation of long term socio-economic impacts cannot be
made with the information available at present. It is
possible, however, to make some qualified assumptions, and
then, based on the best information available, to estimate
the relative distribution of potential long term economic
benefits under the provisions of the Agreement. The principal
benefit of the proposed action would be its assurance of
long term resource productivity, and evaluation of the long
term impacts on the human environment should focus on how
each country might benefit from that productivity. To do so,
it is necessary to project what long term resource productiv-
ity may offer in terms of annual harvests from the stocks.

Although scientific knowledge of the fisheries affected
by the Agreement is less than complete, estimates can be
made of the potential average annual yields that may be sus-
tainable over the long term from the various stocks. The
estimates listed in Table II are based on the best current

- 114 -

scientific knowledge of the fisheries, and assume rebuilding
of several stocks as well as effective conservation and
management of all stocks.

Based on existing knowledge of resource dynamics and
past observations of the effects of various rates of exploi-
tation on resource abundance. Table IV projects the average
annual harvesting potential thought consistent with the long
term resource productivity from stocks covered by the Agreement,
Because these potential levels are averages, in any given
year or years actual harvests may exceed or fall below them,
provided the average itself is maintained over time. Given
the management uncertainties involved, simultaneous maximiza-
tion of yields for all stocks covered by the Agreement is not
likely, and may not even be biologically possible. For the
purposes here, however, the simplifying assumption is made
that simultaneous maximization can be achieved.

By applying each country's percentage-share entitlements
to these potential harvest levels it is possible to estimate
(1) the extent to which existing levels differ from potential
levels, and (2) the relative distribution of benefits under
the Agreement at these potential levels.

Estimating the value of these potential harvests in
the long term presents a more difficult problem. Since, for
the most part, the potential catch levels shown in Table IV
represent significant increases beyond existing levels, it

- 115 -

is unrealistic to use current prices to evaluate future
harvests because of the elasticity of prices in response to
increased or decreased supply. On the other hand, it is not
possible to project future prices at such levels without
making so many assumptions about demand variables as to
defeat the reliability of the exercise. Valuing shares of
shares of potential harvests using 1978 prices would be
inaccurate in forecasting actual values at these potential
levels since price is a function of numerous variables. To
make any prediction of actual future prices would require
separate sets and subsets of assumptions about each variable,
each set and subset making the end result more tenuous and
less reliable than the last. However, assuming that the
values of the various species in relation to each other
remain approximately the same over time, valuing potential
shares at average 1978 ex-vessel prices illustrates relative
benefits to each country. Even so, existing relative values
of the various species are themselves likely to be affected
by demand and supply in the market place, but exactly how
they will be affected is impossible to predict. Therefore,
the long term values estimated below should be taken only as
a general indication of potential changes in relative distri-
bution of benefits, and not as a forecast of projected actual
revenues.

- 116 -

It is also-assumed for the purpose of this analysis
that the entitlement shares provided in the Agreement would
remain the same over the long term. In reality, of course,
the Agreement provides for adjustment of shares at ten
year intervals, consistent with the boundary adjudication.
That outcome is impossible to predict at this time. Finally,
it is assumed that U.S. and Canadian fishermen would increase
fleet capacity and effort to the point that their respective
entitlement shares would be fully utilized.

Shares values are computed using 1978 average U.S.
ex-vessel prices, and potential harvests are compared with
1978 base year harvest levels, except where noted.

The stocks covered by the Agreement can conveniently
be divided into three categories shov;n in Table IV;

1. Those which are located primarily in the undisputed
Canadian zone , comprising about 42 percent of the tonnage
and 31 percent of the value of the potential long term
annual harvest of all stocks covered by the Agreement.

2. Those which are located primarily in the undisputed
U.S. zone , which comprise about 8 percent of the potential
annual tonnage and 11 percent of the potential value, and

3. Those which range significantly into or across the
boundary region and comprise the remaining 50 percent of the
potential annual tonnage and 58 percent of the value.

In the undisputed Canadian zone , U.S. fishermen would
be entitled to a potential annual harvest of 15.5 thousand

- 117 -

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- 119 -

NOTES TO TABLE IV

* Provisional estimates that assume rebuilding and
conservation of stocks.

** Derived from average 1978 U.S. ex-vessel prices in
Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Connecticut.

1/ Entitlements for herring apply only to the adult

fishery, and do not include the juvenile fishery which
takes place within three nautical miles of the coast
of the United States and Canada. The potential annual
average harvest level shown is the midpoint between
the possible range (90-104,000 MT) identified in the
Pelagic Subcommittee Report (78/5) of the Canadian
Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Assessment Committee as
the 1979-86 estimated range.

2/ Entitlements for cod in Area 4X apply only to cod

located offshore in the portion of Area 4X south and
east of straight lines connecting coordinates 44°20'
north latitude, 63°20' west longitude; then 43°00'
north latitude, 65°40' west longitude; then 43°00'
north latitude, 67°40' west longitude. It is assumed
that Canada's catch from this stock in 1977 was its
ICNAF quota allocation of 3,600 tons. (Canada's
catch from the entire Area 4X cod stock in both inshore
and offshore areas was reported as 22,100 metric tons
valued at about U.S. $11 million on the basis of 1977
U.S. average ex-vessel prices.)

3^/ The United States share of the allowable catch from
this stock is 10 percent of any amount that may be
harvested by Canadian vessels based outside the Gulf
of St. Lawrence; Canada currently reserves the harvest
entirely for vessels based in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

4^/ For redfish in Area 3-0, the U.S. entitlement would be
600 tons annually; the Canadian entitlement would be
the remainder of the allowable catch, i.e., 100 percent
less 600 tons.

5^/ No assessment is available of the potential long term

annual average harvest of "other groundfish," as defined
in the Agreement, from Areas 3 and 4. Various approxi-
mations based on historic catch levels could be used.

- 120 -

NOTES TO TABLE IV (cont'd.)

For purposes here the 1975-77 average annual catch
figure is listed. Because it is somewhat more
conservative than the average annual catch figure
during the period 1965-77 (200,000 MT) listed else-
where in this statement, it offers a greater margin
of safety and potentially a broader range of manage-
ment options.

6^/ The Agreement percentage shares for lobster in
Subdivision 5Ze are provisionally assumed to be
87.2 percent for the United States and 12.8 percent
for Canada, which are the relative shares each
country took of the total Subdivision 5Ze lobster
catch in 1975-77.

Until a maritime boundary is determined there would
be nor expansion of either country's directed fishery
for lobster in the boundary region unless otherwise
agreed in the Commission established under the Agree-
ment. After a maritime boundary is established, each
country would manage and have exclusive access to
lobster on its side of the boundary, unless otherwise
mutually agreed.

!_/ Percentage share that would prevail at the end of the
initial 6-year period the Agreement is in force.

8^/ No assessment is available of the potential long term
annual average harvest of "other groundfish," as
defined in the Agreement, from Areas 5 and 6. Various
approximations based on historic catch levels could
be used. For purposes here the 1975-77 average annual
catch figure is listed. Because it is somewhat more
conservative than the average annual catch figures
during the period 1965-77 (70,000 MT) listed elsewhere
in this statement, it offers a greater margin of
safety and potentially a broader range of management
options.

- 121 -

metric tons (MT) worth about $7.7 million. After ten years,
when the U.S. entitlement to Canadian redfish would termi-
nate, the annual U.S. share remaining would be 7.9 thousand
MT, valued at $4.9 million. In 1978 U.S. fishermen caught
only 3.7 thousand MT in the Canadian zone, and in 19 77 only
5.5 thousand MT. Thus, the annual U.S. harvest in the
Canadian zone could increase over 1978 levels by almost 12
thousand MT in the first ten years of the Agreement. (See
figure 8) . After termination of the U.S. redfish entitle-
ment, there would still be a potential gain in annual catch
of 4.2 thousand MT over 19 78 levels. (In the absence of an
agreement, of course, the United States would not have access
to the undisputed Canadian zone.) Canadian fishermen, on
the other hand, caught 25.5 thousand MT over their potential
share of stocks covered by the Agreement in their own zone
in 1978.

In the undisputed U.S. zone the potential annual
Canadian entitlement share is estimated at 4,1 thousand MT,
worth $4.2 mission, excluding transboundary and boundary
region stocks. Since Canada's 19 7 8 harvest in the U.S.
zone was only about 400 MT , the annual Canadian catch could
increase by 3.7 thousand MT under the Agreement, but only in
the first ten years. At that time, the Canadian Loligo
squid entitlement would terminate, and Canada's share of the

Figure 8

POTENTIAL LONG-TERM INCREASE (OR DECREASE) IN AVERAGE
ANNUAL HARVEST*

DECREASE

-100,000 MT
L

U.S. ZONE STOCKS

CANADIAN ZONE STOCKS

TRANSBOUNDARY AND
BOUNDARY REGION STOCKS

It
<

> V)

CO >

< (t

CQ <

OOl
p^

INCREASE

+ 100,000 MT

200,000 MT

1_

^300,000 MT

* Based on entitlement shares of estimated potential long-term sustainable catch
(see table), and assuming rebuilding of stocks.

3546 12 79 STATE (RGE)

122

- 123 -

potential annual catch would drop to 128 MT ^ worth an esti-
mated $70 thousand, less than Canada's 1978 harvest in the
U.S. zone. U.S. fish(?rmen, on the other hand, could poten-
tially increase their average annual harvest by about 32
thousand MT over 1978 levels.

Thus, the United States would trade a potential annual
catch of 4.1 thousand MT of fish in the U.S. zone, worth an
estimated $4.2 million, for 15.5 thousand MT of Canadian
fish potentially worth $7.7 million. After the reciprocal
redfish and Loligo entitlements expire the potential annual
U.S. harvest of Canadian zone stocks is estimated at 7.95
thousand MT, valued at $4.9 million, while Canada would be
entitled to a potential annual catch of 128 MT in the U.S.
zone, worth about $70 thousand.

Tra nsbou ndary stocks which range significantly into or
across the boundary region, comprise the largest portion of
the stocks aftecti^d by the Agreement--sl ightly over half the
total tonnage, and almost 60 percent of the value of the
potential annual long-tc;rm yield for all stocks. U.S.
fishermen would be entitled to about 68 percent of the long-
term potential transboundary stock harvest, or 424.5 thousand
MT annually. The potential value of that share, at 1978
prices is about $200.9 million a year or 61 percent of the
value of all transboundary stocks. As effective management
is introduced under the Agreement, the U.S. fleet could

- 124

potentially increase its annual catch of transboundary stoc'Ks
by about 290 thousand MT, more than tripling the 1978 catch
level ot 134.6 thousand MT .

Canada has traditionally taken between 90 and 95
percent of. its Subarea 5 and 6 catch from the ooundary
region, and can continue to do so in the absence of an
Agreement. Under the Agreement, Canadian fisnermen would be
entitled to a potential annual harvest of 200.5 thousand MT
or 32 percent of the total potential transboundary stock
yield. The potential value of that share is $126.6 million
a yeai or about 39 percent. In 1978 Canadian fishermen took
72.4 thousand MT from transboundary stocks, and so could
potentially harvest an additional 128.1 thousand MT a year
under the Agreement in the long term.

Man agement A uthor i ty

Allocation of management authority is illustrated in
figure 9. The United States would have primary management
authority under the Agreement for all stocks located chiefly
in the undisputed U.S. zone. The potential value of these
stocks, at 1978 prices, is approximately $59.3 million a
year. Likewise, Canada would have primary management
authority for all stocks located chiefly in the undisputed
Canadian zone, potentially worth about $175.9 million a
year .

Figure 9

ALLOCATIONS OF PRIMARY MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
BY VALUE OF POTENTIAL HARVEST*

♦Potential annual long-term sustainable catch,
at 1978 exvessel prices in U.S. dollars.

3544 12-79 STATE (RGE)

125

- 126 -

For transboundary stocks, which r^inge significantly
into or across the boundary area, U.S. primary management
authority wouL<i cover stocks potentially worth approximat-ily
$191.3 million a year, or 58 percent. Canada would have
primary management authority £or stocks worth about $56,0
million a year, or 17 percent. The remaining transboundary
stocks would be managed jointly.

In sum, under the Agreement the United States would
have primary management authority over stocks with a oot-^n-
tial total annual value of $250.6 million, or 45 percent,
whilB Canada woi.ld manage stocks potentially worth $231.9
million a year, comprising 41 percent. The remaining 14
percent would be managed jointly.

Access

One of the objectives of the Agreement is to preserve
traditional fishing patterns in order to minimize adverse
socio-economic impacts on either side. Consistent with this
objective, there is no portion of the U.S. zone to which
Canadian fishermen have access under the Agreement which has
not been traditionally fished by Canadian fishermen. Except
for Loligo squid, there is no portion of the Canadian zone
to which U.S. fishermen have access under the Agreement
which has not been traditionally fished by U.S. fishermen.

- 127

The or\lv species covered by the Agreement which has not been
fished traditionally bv Canadian fishermen is Loligo squid.

Overal 1 Long-term Benefits

Under the cooperative management framework provided by
th£! Agreement tht.'re is a potential lOc ef feet ive ly managii:j
and rebuilding the stocks in the long term, thereby substan-
tially incfeasing the coverall value of the total resource
to the benefit of both countries. Although both countries
will gain, as shown in figure 10, th^.- distribution of poten-
tial benefits under the Agreement appears to favor the
United States m the long term.

The Agreement provides for two types of " transact ions"-
ficst, a trade of access to U.S fish cor access to Canadian
fish, and second, allocat i on of shares of the transboundary
stocks. The fish caught by each country i.n its own undis-
puted zone are not counted in the transaction in this analy-
sis, since they have not been available to the other side
since reciprocal fisheries were suspended in June 1978,
and are unlikely to be available in the future absent an
agreement.

In the long term the United States would trade a
potential annual catch of 4.1 thousand MT potentially worth
$4.2 million, for 15.5 thousand MT of Canadian zone fish
potentially worth $7.7 million.

Figure 10

DISTRIBUTION OF THE VALUE OF POTENTIAL ANNUAL
LONG-TERM CATCH SHARES*

Canadian share from U.S. zone stocks
$4,236,000

U.S. share from Canadian zone stocks
$7,748,000

Canadian share from transboundary and
boundary region stocks

$126,562,000

U.S. share from transboundary and
boundary region stocks

$200,862,000

*Excluding each country's catch within its own zone.
Based on potential annual average long-term sustainable
catch, at 1978 exvessel prices.

3545 12-79 STATE (RGE)

128

- 129 -

In the allocation of shares of transboundary stocks,
61 peccent by value could accrue to the United States, a
p.ot'jntial annual valu^: of $200 8 million. The Canadian share
would be about 39 percent, potentially worth $126.6 million.

The combined long-t-irm benefits to both countries,
excluding each side's harvest in its own zone, could
potentially total $339.4 million annually. As shown in
figure lo . 61.5 percent of this annual total, or $208.6
million, would accrue to the United States. Canada's share
would be 38.5 percent of the total, with a potential annual
value of $13u.4 million.

Summary of Long-term Impa cts

Based on the best current scientific estimates
available, the potential increase in annual harvest under
the Agreement would substantially benefit the U.S. fishing
industry in the long term, assuming effective management and
rebuilding of depleted stocks. Furthermore, a substantially
greater proportion of the total potential long-term benefits
would appear to accrue to the U.S. side, both in the exchange
of access to stocks in the Parties ' respective undisputed
zones, and in the shared allocation of transboundary stocks.

- 130 -

B . Environmental Consequences of Alternatives to the
Proposed Action

1 . Uo Agreement

Two categories of consetjuences can be anticipated if
the aqreeir.ent is not implenented and not other action
is taken to conclude a fishery agreement with Canada.
First, the specific benefits to the United States that will
accrue from the proposed action would be lost. Second,
current risks to the environment v^ould continue and
potentially increase.'

Specific benefits to the United States under the
proposed action that would be lost under this alternative
are numerous. In the absence of a fishery agreement, the
United States and Canada would have no formal mechanism or
procedure to coordinate conservation goals and management
policies for shared resources. These goals and policies
currently differ in several areas. For example, Canada
favors commercial uses for the transboundary mackerel
stock. In contrast, U.S. management plans for mackerel
emphasize enhancement of the U.S. recreational fishery.

- 131 -

The stock is available in the undisputed fishery zones
of both countries, and fishing in either Canadian or U.S.
waters can affect the entire stock. In the absence of some
means of striking a balance between potentially divergent
interests, there is no assurance that each side will not
embark on its own management policies reflecting its own
conservation proprities and resulting in two separate
approaches to the same stock of fish.

Similarly, in the absence of a fishery agreement,
disagreements are likely to continue over appropriate
national shares of annual harvests (even where these can be
agreed) from stocks to which both countries have access
either in their undisputed zones or in the boundary region
on Georges Bank. For example, in October 1978, in response
at least in part to what it perceived to be a relaxation
of U.S. regulations in the groundfish fishery on Georges
Bank, Canada relaxed trip limitations for its fishermen in
that fishery. By year's end, the combined U.S. and
Canadian catch of haddock in Subarea 5 and Statistical Area
6 exceeded 28,0U0 tons, whereas the New England Fishery
Management Council had established the optimum yield for
haddock at 20,000 tons. Similarly, U.S. and Canadian
catches of cod from Subdivision 5Z and Statistical Area 6

- 132 -

exceeded 36,000 tons, whereas the New England Council had
set the optimum yield at 26,000 tons. The result, if the
optimum yields are used as a yardstick, was overfishing of
two important stocks.

The proposed action would eliminate disagreements
over national shares through its entitlement share provi-
sions and would require that both countries observe the
TACs established for each stock. Moreover, formal proce-
dures would exist through which the Parties could discuss
and resolve differences in management strategies. For
Category A and B stocks, they would have recourse to
binding dispute settlement.

As previously mentioned, since June 1978 U.S.
fishermen have been excluded from undisputed Canadian
waters. Under the proposed action they would regain access
to these waters and be able to resume their traditional
fisheries for redfish, cod, and haddock. In the absence of
a fishery agreement, such access presumably would continue
to be denied them.

Continued denial of access to the Canadian zone would
substantially affect certain U.S. fishing ports, particu-
larly in Maine and Massachusetts. For example, the NMFS
study on the short term economic impact of the proposed
action predicts that vessels over 125 feet in length from

- 133 -

Rockland and Portland could lose about 60 percent and 30
percent, respectively, of revenues they would otherwise
gain with access to the Canadian zone. Lost access to
haddock and cod in the Canadian zone could cause Boston and
Gloucester to forego about $2 million otherwise available
in 1980.

If vessels which would otherwise operate in the
Canadian zone shift their effort to the U.S. zone (as has
already occurred) there would be (and have been) spillover
effects on smaller vessel classes in terms of the erosion
of relative shares of landings from various stocks. Thus,
revenue losses forecast for some vessel classes would be
"made up" by effort transfers from the Canadian to the U.S.
zone, with resultant revenue transfers from smaller vessel
classes to larger ones.

In addition, due to a reduced supply of raw fish from the
Canadian zone, processing plants in Maine and Massachusetts could
lose about $6.9 million 1980. Over half of this reduction
is associated with reduced redfish output, while one-third
is associated with reduced haddock landings by U.S. vessels
from the Canadian zone. About 112 full-time processing
jobs would be lost. This loss would also involve many more
part-time or seasonal jobs, an important source of supple-
mentary income to those in coastal areas. If such reduc-
tions in the processing sector were mitigated by imports of

- 134 -

\;hoIe fresh fish, the U.S. balance of payments deficit in
fisheries would increase commensurate ly .

The fishery resources agreement and the agreement to
arbitrate the maritime boundary are expressly linked;
neither can enter into force without the other. Thus, if
the proposed action is not implemented, current arrange-
ments between the United States and Canada to submit the
maritime boundary issue to binding dispute settlement would
lapse by their terms. Should this occur, Canadian fisher-
men presumably will have access indefinitely to a signifi-
cant portion of Georges Bank claimed by the United States.
Traditionally, about 95 percent of Canadian catches on
Georges Bank have been taken in the disputed zone. With
the exception of Loligo squid, all species for which Canada
has an entitlement under the proposed action are available
to Canadian fishermen in potentially greater amounts either
in the Canadian zone or in the area of overlapping boundary
claims .

Thus, in the absence of a fishery agreement,
Canadian fishermen would be able to continue their tradi-
tional fisheries largely unaffected by denial of access to
the undisputed U.S. zone. Also, they would be under no
obligation to observe any restraints contained in U.S.
management plans to rebuild depleted stocks or to assure

- 135 -

long term resource productivity. The New England and Mid-
Atlantic Fishery Management Councils would thus continue in
the difficult situation they currently face, imposing
restraints on U.S. fishermen while having no control over
Canadian fishermen fishing the same stocks.

The second category of consequences flowing from the
"no agreement" alternative includes the continuation and
possible increase of current risks to the environment. As
mentioned with respect to groundfish on Georges Bank, disa-
greement over appropriate national shares of the annual
harvests for shared stocks is likely to lead to exploita-
tion rates higher than either country individually would
recommend. Depending on the level of exploitation and the
length of time involved, stock abundance can be sharply
reduced. History demonstrates that depletion of stocks in
great demand has been the rule rather than the exception
from the North Sea to Georges Bank where two or more
countries have access to fishery resources in common with-
out an effective agreement on how such resources are to be
shared and managed .

Many shared stocks, particularly scallops, cod,
haddock, and pollock, at present are subject to significant
risks of depletion. For example, the annual average
harvest of scallops from Georges Bank (Subdivision 5Ze)

- 136 -

that may be sustainable over the long term has been esti-
mated at 10,000 tons. In 1977 and 1978, U.S. and Canadian
harvests from this area totaled over 17,500 tons. In the
absence of a fishery agreement limiting total harvests,
both sides are free to attempt to outfish each other in
this area. Although either may thus gain a temporary
advantage over the other, catches at 1977 and 1978 levels,
if sustained, ultimately will reduce stock abundance. Over
time, each side could find itself competing for a larger
slice of a smaller pie to a point, perhaps, where fishing
becomes uneconomical.

In contrast to this open-ended situation and its
potential for severe economic dislocation among those
dependent on the fisheries, the proposed action will
enable both countries to achieve a measure of stability for
their fishing communities. Investments in fishing and pro-
cessing are thus likely to be protected and encouraged.

A final example of these risks to the environment in
the absence of an effective fishery agreement is that of
haddock. In 1964, recent trends in the fishery indicated
that the haddock resource included strong year-classes,
that stock abundance was rising, and that prospects for the
future were relatively good. In this situation in 1965 and
1966, the Soviet Union greatly increased fishing pressure
on haddock and captured a major share of the landings.

- 137 -

Subsequently, the haddock stock and fishery collapsed.
Where U.S. fishermen landed about 46,500 tons annually from
1935-1960, their landings fell to only 3,018 tons in 1973,
a decline of 94 percent from the U.S. catch of 51,895 tons
in 1964. Mo year-classes of any consequence were produced
during the decade between 1964 and 1974.

Although the haddock resource has since recovered
to a point that can be termed hopeful, the United States
and Canada are also at a point where, through competitive
fishing, haddock productivity again could decline.

For these reasons, the "no agreement" alternative
holds few attractions and may exacerbate existing problems.

- 138 -

2 . Settlement of the Maritime Boundary, Only

Establishing a maritime boundary without an Agreement
would mean that, instead of competing for a given stock in
the boundary region on Bank Bank, both countries could
continue to fish competitively for that stock within their
areas of exclusive jurisdiction. The management and resource
sharing problems discussed regarding the "No Agreement"
alternative would be unresolved, since management jursidic-
tion over the stocks would be divided. The Agreement, on
the other hand, gives the United States primary or joint
management responsibility for all finfish on Georges Bank
except argentine, no matter where the boundary is delimited.

Only if the U.S. position prevailed completely would
the U.S. retain most of the Georges Bank stocks. Even so,
such important stocks as mackerel, pollock, and herring
would continue to range across the boundary into the
Canadian undisputed zone.

Any boundary outcome short of the full U.S. claim
would divide almost all the stocks on Georges Bank, includ-
ing those of the Northeast Peak, the most productive portion
of the Bank, particularly for scallps. Such an outcome
could also intensify competitive fishing pressure on the
stocks if either countr, or both, concluded that the nature
of the boundary settlement entitled it to increase its
share of the harvest.

- 139 -

Under tlie agreement, even if the Canadian boundary
claim sliould fully prevail, U.S. fishermen are protected.
In the first ten years the United States could lose no more
than ten percent of its entitlement share for those stocks
for which it has a 50 percent or greater initial entitlement,
or five percent of those for whch it has less than a 50
percent initial entitlement. Even if redetermination of
entitlement took place each ten years, v/hich is allowed
but not required, under the Agreement, if the Canadian
claim should prevail in its entirety, the U.S. could lose
all of its claim to the resources in the disputed zone,
including the valuable Northeast Peak stocks.

3 . Negotiate a Resource Agreement Subsequent to
Delimitation of a Maritime Boundary

This alternative could involve accepting for a period
of several years, while the boundary was determined pre-
sumably through arbitration, the status quo of no resource

- 140 -

agreement. During such period, there would be the attendant
risks to resources noted in the discussion of Alternative 1
above.

Once a boundary was determined, it would eliminate
the present area of overlapping jurisdictional claims and
define the physical areas over which each party exercises
jurisdiction. Such developments would obviously be taken
into consideration by the United States and Canada in
resource negotiations undertaken subsequent to the boundary
delimitation.

If the United States position were fully upheld in
the boundary adjudication, the United States would be under
no obligation to allow Canada access to Georges Bank and
would be able to manage unilaterally the stocks that do not
range beyond Georges Bank or other Gulf of Maine areas
under the exclusive fisheries jurisdiction of the United
States. (As indicated in the discussion of Alternative 2
above, some fishery stocks, however, would range across a
boundary entirely consistent with the U.S. boundary claim,
and continue to require coordinated management by the
United States and Canada.)

On the other hand, if the Canadian position on the boun-
dary should prevail, Canada could bar U.S. fishermen from the

- 141 -

northeastern third of Georges Bank, an extremely important
area for scallops, haddock, cod, yellowtail flounder, and
many other species. Moreover, since almost all of the
stocks on Georges Bank would be transboundary in nature,
the cooperation of Canada in managing these stocks would be
essential if overfishing were to be avoided. If Canada
established undisputed jurisdiction over an important part
of the range of these Goreges Bank stocks, it is only
reasonable to anticipate that Canada would insist that any
cooperative management arrangement for these stocks be
truly a joint exercise of the two governments. This would
mean that each country would have an equal voice in managing
the Georges Bank Stocks. In contest, the framework set forth
in the proposed action provides the United States primary
management responsibility for the great majority of Georges
Bank stocks (see Section II) .

A similar need for joint management of Georges Bank
stocks could also result if a boundary were to fall some-
where between the claims of the two countries such that
Canada secured exclusive fisheries jurisdiction over a
significant part of the .northeastern third of Georges Bank.

A boundary running somewhere between the boundary
claims of the two countries and establishing some part of

- 142 -

Georges Bank as a zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction
and access for each country could also intensify competi-
tive fishing pressures on Georges Bank stocks. It is
likely that each country in its limited zone of exclusive
access would strive to harvest a share of the catch from
Georges Bank stocks approximating at least what it had
taken when a larger but shared area of Georges Bank had
been available for fishing. In other words, each country
at a minimum would strive to prevent disruption of its
traditional fishing activities, even if this led to more
intensive fishing in a more restricted area. In addition,
either country or both might conclude that the nature
of the boundary settlement entitled it to an increased
share of the harvest of particular stocks.

The result could easily be total catches in excess
of what either country individually would recommend, pro-
ducing threats to resource stability as well as com-
plicating future efforts to determine hov; resources
available for both countries should be shared and managed
after the boundary delimitation.

The risk of such developments if the fishing areas
of Georges Bank are divided between the two countries
arises because:

- 143 -

(1) the section of Georges Bank which could become a
Canadian exclusive fisheries zone of Canada's boundary
position prevailed, i.e., some part of the north-
eastern area of Georges Bank, is an exceptionally pro-
ductive fishing ground. U.S. and Canadian combined
catches during 1965-1976, from roughly the northeastern
third of Georges Bank, produced approximately 46 per-
cent of the Subarea 5 haddock catch, 43 percent of the
Division 5Z cod catch, 33 percent of the Georges Bank
yellowtail flounder catch, and 79 percent of the Georges
Bank scallop catch taken by the combined fleets of the
two countries. The northeastern edge of Georges Bank
has been the most reliable area of good scallop
recruitment, and is currently the only part of the

Bank with good scallop recruitment;

(2) historical data substantially understate
harvesting possibilities if fishing effort is
intensified. For example Canadian vessels alone,
primarily as a result of a period of intensified
fishing for haddock on the northeastern part of
Georges Bank during the Fall of 19 78, took 39 percent
of the total Subarea 5 haddock catch of the tv/o
countries .

- 144 -

Thus, there could be exacerbated risks of overfishing of
major fishery stocks that are currently fully exploited,
if there were any significant division of Georges Bank into
zones of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction for the United
States and Canada. In such a situation, the combined
efforts of the fishing vessels of the two countries in the
respective fisheries zones of the two countries could pro-
duce combined total catches that could compromise the long-
term productivity of the stocks.

Pressures in the two countries to maintain established
fisheries, set against conflicting pressures to capitalize
on any apparent advantage flowing from a boundary settlement
dividing Georges Bank in some manner into exclusive fishing
zones for the two countries, might make it difficult either
to (1) conclude a fisheries agreement promptly after such
a boundary settlement, or (2) in the absence of som.e
agreement with Canada, to maintain the restraint necessary
to assure the long-term stability of shared and fully
exploited stocks.

In summary, there are very substantial risks to the
protection and preservation of the fishery stocks associated
with this alternative, particularly if the U.S. boundary
position were not fully upheld and if there were no mechanism
in place to prevent competative overfishing.

- 145 -

4. Negotiate a Less Comprehensive Resource Agreement
Pending Delimitation of a Maritime Boundary

Since this alternative addresses only the situation
prior to delimitation of a maritime boundary, the
discussion above under Alternative 3 regarding the resource
situation after a boundary delimitation would also be
applicable in connection with the long-term implications
of this shorter-term alternative.

Obviously any approach has merit that can help
address even in the short term the growing risk to long-
term productivity of resources posed by the strong
pressures to maximize current fishing opportunities for
those fisheries stocks now shared by both countries.

There are, however, certain difficulties with and
disadvantages of this alternative which relate to how
effective and reliable such an interim approach might be.

To some extent both countries have resorted to this
alternative in the past as witnessed by the 1977 Reciprocal
Fisheries Agreement and the aborted 1978 continuation of
that Agreement. The bilateral understandings contained in
those Agreements provided a certain degree of restraint as
both countries sought to conclude long-term arrangements.
These understandings ceased to apply after June 1978 when

- 146 -

the countries failed to implement the 1978 Agreement.
Thus, even if an interim approach could be
negotiated, past experience raises questions whether it
could be maintained during the several years that v;ould
probably be needed at a minimum to resolve the boundary
issue .

Another difficulty is that stocks most immediately
threatened with intense fishing pressure for the most part
are those fully exploited by both countries, and the
fishermen of both countries thus have substantial economic
interests at stake. An interim agreement providing
effective conservation of these stocks would require mutual
self-restraint in the present in order to maintain longer
term resource productivity and fishing opportunities in the
future. The acceptance of such restraint in the present
may become difficult, however, when neither country or its
fishermen under an interim agreement could have assurance
that a new agreement developed after the boundary delimita-
tion would allow them to share in future opportunities in
a manner commensurate with the restraint each side exer-
cised during the interim period. Thus, any interim agree-
ment would probably tend to impose only limited restric-
tions on the emerging trend to maximize current fishing
opportunities at the expense of potential future

147

opportunities. Such an approach ever the period of years
that would be required at best to resolve the boundary
question poses significant risks to potential future
opportunities. Thus, a limited approach could delay the
genesis of new and effective procedures for rational
management of shared resources.

- ±^« -

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United States during the past 70 million years. The Geological
Association of Canada Special Paper No. 4, Geology of the
Atlantic Region, November 1967, 53-69.

FAO, 1978. Some Scientific Problems of Multispecies Fisheries:
Report of the Expert Consultation on Management of Multispecies
Fisheries, Rome, 20-23 September 1979. FAO Fish. Tech. Pap.,
( 181) :42n.

(181) :42p

Graham, J.J. 1970. Coastal currents of western Gulf of Maine.
ICNAF Res. Bull 7: 19-31.

Grosslein, M.D. 1973. Mixture of species in Subareas 5&6.
ICNAF Ann. Meet. 1973, Res. Doc. No. 9. Serial No. 2911
(mimeo) , 20p. ui Clark and Brown, 1977.

Grosslein, M.D. 1972. A preliminary investigation of the
effects of fishing on the total fish biomass and first approxi-
mations of maximum sustainable yield for finfish in ICNAF
Division 5Z and Subarea 6. Part I. Changes in the relative
biomass of ground fish in Division 5Z as indicated by research
vessel surveys, and probable maximum yield of the total
groundfish resource. ICNAF Ann. Meet. 1972. Res Doc. No. 119.
Serial No. 2835 (mimeo), 20p _in Clark and Brown.

Grosslein, M.D. 1962. Haddock stocks in the ICNAF convention
area. ICNAF Redbook 1962, Part III: 124-131.

Grosslein, M.D. and H.S. Clark 1976. Distribution of selected
fish species and status of major fisheries in the Northwest
Atlantic. NMFS/NEFC Lab. Ref. 76-12 (MS) 171 p.

Grosslein, M.W. Hahm, M. Sissenwine, E. Henderson and E.
Cohen. 1979. Status Report on Development of a Multispecies
Model of Fish Production. Item 2 of MARMAP: Fisheries Eco-
system Study News. NOAA/NMFS/Narragansett Lab. Ref. 79-12.

Gusey, W. F. 1977. The Fish and Wildlife Resources of the
Georges Bank Region. Shell Oil Company, Houston. 553p.

Halliday, R.G. 1974. Current Status of the ICNAF Div. 4X
Haddock stock. ICNAF Ann. Meeting 1974. Res. Doc. No. 91.

Hare, G.M. 1977. Atlas of the Major Atlantic Coast Fish and
Invertebrate Resources Adjacent to the Canada - United States
Boundary Areas, (MS) 97p.

Hennemuth, R.C. 1969. Status of the Georges Bank haddock
fishery. ICNAF Ann. Meet. 1969, Res. Doc. No. 90, Serial No.
2256 (mimeo), 21p. in Clark and Brown 1977.

- 151 -

Idler, D.R. and P.M. Jangaard 1969. "Cod Fishery", J^
the Encyclopedia of Marine Resources, Frank E. Firth,
Ed. Van Nostrand Reinhold, Co.

Kohler, A.C. 1968. Fish Stocks of the Nova Scotia Banks
and Gulf of St. Lawrence. Fish. Res. Bd. Canada, Tech.
Rep. No. 80.

Lauzier, L.M. 1967. Bottora residual draft on the continental
shelf area of the Canadian Atlantic coast. J. Fish. Res. Bd .
Canada, 24(9) : 1845-59.

Leim, A.H. and W.B. Scott 1966. Fishes of the Atlantic
Coast of Canada. Fish Res. Bd . Canada, Bull. 155, Ottav/a.

Lux, F.E., J.R. Uzmann and H. F. Lind . 1977. Standings of
short fin squid Illex illecebrosus , in Cape Cod Bay in fall,
1976, NMFS/NEFC, Lab. Ref. No. 77-02.

Matis, J. H. 1977. Statistical Methods in Ecology. Texas
A&M University (MS) 225p.

MAFMC 1978. Final Environmental Impact Statement/Fishery
Management Plan on the Atlantic Mackerel Fishery of the
Iv'orthwest Atlantic Ocean Supplement Number 1. MS. November,
1978, Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, 133p.

NEFMC 1979. Silver Hake MP Development, Ne\j England Fishery
Management Council Res. Doc. 79 SH-11 .

NEFMC 1978. Final Environmental Impact Statement/Fishery

Management Plan for the Atlantic Herring Fishery of the

Northwest Atlantic. New England Fishery Management Council
MS. August, 1978.

NMFS/NEFC 1978. Summary of Stock Assessments, August, 1978
by the Resource Assessment Division, "Woods Hole Laboratory
Lab Ref. No. 78-40, 26p.

Northeast Marine Fisheries Board 1978. American Lobster
Fishery Management Plan, MS 180p.

Oldham, W.S. 1972. Biology of Scotian Shelf cus];, Brosme
brosme ICNAF Res. Bull. No. 9:85-98.

Posgay, J. A. 1957. The Range of the Sea Scallop. Nautilus,
71(2) :55-57.

Rathjen, W.F. 1973. Northwest Atlantic squids. Mar. Fish.
Ref. 35(12) :20-26.

- 152 -

Regier, H.A. and H.F. Henderson. 1973. Towards a Broad
Ecological Model of Fish Communities and Fisheries. Trans.
Amer. Fish. Soc . 102 ( 1 ): 56-72.

Research Institute of tlie Gulf of Maine (TRIGOM) 1978.
Draft (Descriptive) Fishery Management Plan for Pollock,
Pollachius virens . MS for the New England Fishery Management
Council February, 1978, 140p.

Research Institute of the Gulf of Maine ( TRIGOM-PARC) . 1974.
A Socio-Economic and Environmental Inventory of the North
Atlantic Region, including the outer continental shelf and
adjacent v/aters from Sandy Hook, New Jersey, Co Bay to Fundy.
(Supported by Bureau of Land Management) Vol. 1, 421p.

Saila, S.B. and J.M. Flowers. 1968. Movements and behavior
of berried female lobsters displaced from offshore areas to
Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island. Jour, du Conseil., 31: 342-351.

Saila, S.B. and S.D. Pratt. 1973. Mid-Atlantic Bight fisheries.
In ; Coastal and offshore environmental inventory - Cape Hatteras
to Nantucket Shoals, Univ. Rhode Island Mar. Pub. Ser . 2.

Schumaker, A. and V.C. Anthony. 1972. Georges Bank ( ICNAF
Division 5Z and Subarea 6) herring assessment. ICNAF Ann.
Meet. 1972. Res. Doc. No. 24, Serial No. 2715 (mimeo), 36p.
in Clark and Brown.

Scott, J.S. 1971. Abundance of groundfishes on the Scotian
Shelf. Fish. Res. Board. Can. Tech. Rep. 260, 18p.

Serchuk, F.M., P.W. Vvood and B.E. Brown. 1978. Assessment,
Current Status, and Future Outlook of Sea Scallop Populations
( Placopecten magellanicus ) in the Georges Bank and Mid-
Atlantic Regions. NMFS/NEFC Lab. Ref. 78-52, November 1978,
38p.

Serchuk, F.M., P.W. Wood, J. A. Penttila and B.E. Brown. 1979a
Status of the Georges Bank and Gulf of Maine Cod Stocks.
NMFS/NEFC Lab. Ref. 79-10, February 1979, 32p.

Serchuk, F.M., P.W. Wood, J. A. Posgay and B.E. Brown. 1979b.
Assessment and Status of Sea Scallop ( Placopecten magellanicus )
population off the Northeast Coast of the United States.
Proc. Nat'l. Shellfish Assoc. (In press.)

Sette, O. E. 1950. Biology of the Atlantic Mackerel,
Scomber scombr us North America. Part II: Migrations and
Habits. Fish. Bull. U.S., 49:251-358.

- 153 -

Sherman, K. 1978. MARi^IAP, A Fisheries Ecosystem Study in the
NW Atlantic: Fluctuations in Ichthyoplankton-Zooplankton
Components and their potential tor impact on the system. Paper
presented to the advanced ocean measurements workshop I, held
at the Belle W. Baruch Institute for Marine Biology and
Coastal Research, University of South Carolina, sponsored by
Office of Naval Research, Dept. of Navy, Oct. 24-28, 1978.
38p. Item 8 of MARMAP : Fisher ies Ecosystem Study News.
NOAA/NMFS/Narrayansett Lab. Ref. 79-12.

Sissenwine, M.P., A.M.T. Lange and G.T. Waring. 1977.
Biological considerations relevant to determining the optimum
yield of squid ( Lol igo and Illex ) of the Northwest Atlantic
continental shelf of the USA for 1978. NEFC, NMFS (MS).

Smith, K.A. and F.L. Olson, 1976. Brief historical synopsis
of certain Northeast U.S. Fisheries. NMFS/NEFC Lab. Ref. 76-11.

Squires, H.J. 1976. Growth and hypothetical age of the
Newfoundland bait squid, Illex illelebrosus , J. Fish. Res.
Bd. Canada 24 ( 6 ) :1 209-1217.

Steele, D.H. 1963. Pollock [ Pollachius virens (L.)] in the
Bay of Fundy. J. Fish. Res. Bd . Canada 20:1267-1314.

Sverdrup, H.U., M.W. Johnson and R.A. Fleming. 1942. The
oceans: their physics, chemistry, and general biology.
Prentise-Hall , Inc., New York, 1087p.

Uchupi. 1966. Topography & Structure of the Northeast
Channel, Gulf of Maine. 50 Bull. Am. Ass. Pet. Geol. 165-166.

Vovk, A.N. 1969. Prospects for a squid ( Lol igo pealei
Le Sever) fishery. Rybin. Khoz, 45(10) :7-9.

Wilson, J. and R. Peters. 1978. 1978 Census of New England
Commercial Fishermen, Preliminary Draft Report. U. Maine
37p.

Wise, J. P. ed . 1974. The- United States Marine Fishery
Resource. MARMAP Contribution No. 1, NMFS/NOAA, March 1974.

Wise, J. P. 1963. Cod groups in the New England area. Fish.
Bull. U.S. 63:189-203.

- 154 -

VI. List of Preparers

Dorothy E. Bergamaschi--Analyst , Office of the Geographer,

Department of State

B.S. (Geography), University of Miami, 1972

M.A. (Urban and Regional Planning), University of Miami,

1979
Co-author: Environmental Quality by Design, University

of Miami Press, 1975

James S.W. Drewry--Senior Counsel for International Law,

Office of the General Counsel,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Department of Commerce

B.A. (Political Science) , Randolph Macon College, 1966
LL.B., University of Virginia, 1969

LL.M. (International Law) , London School of Economics,
1975

Susan E. Jelley — Atlantic Fisheries Officer, Office of

Fisheries Affairs, Department of State

A.B. (Marine Biology) , Occidental College, 1975
M.S. (Marine Resources Management), Texas A&M
University, 1977

Joseph J. Mueller--Industry Economist, Northeast Region,

National Marine Fisheries Service,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Department of Commerce

B.S. (Economics), St. Louis University, 1969
M.S. (Agricultural Economics), Cornell University, 1973
M.B.A. (Finance) , Suffolk University, 1978
Ph.D. Candidate (Agricultural Economics) , Cornell
University, 1982

Frederick C. Paine — Analyst, Office of Conservation and

Management, National Marine Fisheries
Service, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, Department
of Commerce

B.A. (Political Science) , University of New Hampshire,

1977
M.A. Candidate (Political Science) , University of

New Hampshire, 1980

- 155 -

List of preparers (cont'd)

6. Daniel A. Reifsnyder — Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of

International Fisheries Affairs,
National Marine Fisheries Service,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Department of Commerce

A.B. (Political Philosophy) , Trinity College, 1972

M,A. (Russian Area Studies) , Georgetown University, 1976

J,D. Candidate, George Washington University, 1981

/

156 -

VII. LIST OF REVIEWERS

Private

Dr. James Acheson
Department of Anthropology
University of Maine
Pemagrud Harbor, Maine

Atlantic Offshore Fish

and Lobster Association
P.O. Box 438
Bristol, Rhode Island 02809

David Bergson

Vice-President and Manager
Maine Fisheries, Inc.
Holyoke Wharf
Portland, Maine 04101

Fdward Bradley

Department of Marine Fisheries

State House

Augusta, Maine 04330

Antonio Brancaleone
2 Hesperus Circle
Magnolia, Mass.

Robert Brieze
10 Jarvis Avenue
Fairhaven, Mass.

02719

John Burt

New Bedford Fishermen's Union

62 N. Water Street

New Bedford, Mass. 02740

Gloucester Fisheries Association
29 Ocean Avenue
Magnolia, Mass. 01950

James Costakes

Seafood Producers' Association

60 North Water Street

New Bedford, Mass. 02740

Michael Costello
Executive Director
Cape Ann Chamber of

Commerce
128 Main Street
Gloucester, Mass. 01930

Meta Gushing
P.O. Box 525
Pigeon Cove,

Mass. 01966

Roy Enoksen

New Bedford Seafood

Producers' Association
60 North Water Street
New Bedford, Mass. 02740

Luie Fass
Atlantic Fisheries

Association
48 Water Street
Hampton, Virginia 23663

Gustave Fritschie
Director of Government

Relations
National Fisheries

Institute, Inc.
1101 Connecticut Ave., N.W
Washington, D.C. 20036

Michael Guimond

1 Walnut Street
Northampton, Mass. 01060

Pat Hughes
Mass. C.Z.M. Office
100 Cambridge Street
Boston, Mass. 02202

Leif Jacobsen

2 Middle Street
P.O. Box 124
Fairhaven, Mass. 12719

- 157

LIST OF REVIEWERS (cont'd]

Alice Joseph
Provincetown Library
Provincetown, Mass.

Jay Lanzillo
P.O. Box 613
Orleans, Mass.

02653

William Lundrigen

Port Agent

New Bedford Fishermen's Union

62 North Water Street

New Bedford, Mass. 02740

Edward J. MacLeod
General Manager
Lipman Marine Products
State Fish Pier
Gloucester, Mass. 01930

Myron Marder

37 Union Street

New Bedford, Mass. 02740

Francis Mirarchi
Massachusetts Inshore

Draggermans Association
460 Main Street
Marshfield, Mass. 02050

Octavio Modesto

c/o New Bedford Seafood

Producers' Association
60 North Water Street
New Bedford, Mass. 02740

Howard W. Nickerson

Executive Director

New England Steering Committee

P.O. Box J-4093

New Bedford, Mass. 02741

Virgil Norton

Department of Agricultural

Economics
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland 20740

Leno Novello

38 Middle Street

Gloucester, Mass.

01930

Hugh F. O'Rourke
Boston Fisheries

Association, Inc.
253 Northern Avenue
Room 205
Boston, Mass. 02210

Richard N. Peluso
Agromarine Industries, Inc.
P.O. Box J-4044
New Bedford, Mass. 02740

Dave Pierce

Sr. Marine Fish Biologist
Mass. Div. Marine Fish.
100 Cambridge Street
Boston, Mass. 02202

Joseph Piva

Teamsters Union Local 59

28 Cornell Street

New Bedford, Mass. 02740

John Poggie
Dept. of Anthropology
University of Rhode Island
Kingston, Rhode Island

Alison Reiser
Marine Law Institute
246 Deering Avenue
Portland, Maine 04102

Robert Rose

369 Essex Avenue

Gloucester, Mass. 01930

Angela SanFelippo
14 Harold Street
Gloucester, Mass. 01930

- 158 ~

LIST OF REVIEWERS (cont'd)

Lucy Sloan
Executive Director
National Federation of

Fishermen
38 Green Street
Cambridge, Mass. 02139

Albert Sokel

Hale & Dorr

60 State Street

Boston, Mass. 02109

Tim Sullivan
c/o National Fishermen
21 Elm Street
Camden, Maine 04843

Harry Swain

Boat Owners United

58 Lombard Street

New Bedford, Mass. 02740

David Turner
Meral Corporation
Eastport, Maine

James Warren
Executive Director
Maine Sardine Council
Quality Control Laboratory
470 Main Street
Brewer, Maine 04412

Federal

Congressional Reviewers

Senate

Foreign Relations Committee
Commerce, Science and

Transportation Committee
Energy and Natural Resources

House

Merchant Marine and

Fisheries Committee
Commerce Committee
Foreign Affairs Committee

State Delegations

Maine

Senate

William S. Cohen
Edmund Muskie

House

David F. Emory
Olympia J. Snowe

New Hampshire

Senate

John A. Durkin
Gordon J. Humphrey

House

James C. Cleveland
Norman E. D' Amours

Massachusetts

Senate

Edward M. Kennedy
Paul E. Tsongas

House

Nicholas Mauroules
Edward J. Markey
Joe Moakley
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Gerry E. Studds

- 159 -

LIST OF REVIEWERS (cont'd) .

Rhode Island

Senate

John Chafee
Claiborne Pell

House

Edward P. Beard
Fernand J. St. Germain

Connecticut

Senate

Abraham Ribicoff
Lowell P. Weiker

House

Christopher J. Dodd
Robert N. Giaimo
Stewart B. McKinney

New York

Senate

Jacob R, Javits

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

House

Jerome A. Ambro
William Carney
Thomas Downey
Norman F. Lent
John W. Wyder
Richard Ottinger

New Jersey

Senate

William Bradley
Harrison A. Williams Jr.

House

William J. Hughes
James J. Howard
Edward Patten

Deleware

Senate

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
William V. Roth, Jr.

House

Thomas B. Evans

Maryland

Senate

Charles Mathias, Jr.
Paul S. Sarbanes

House

Robert E. Bauman

Virginia

Senate

Harry F. Byrd
John W. Warner

House

G. William Whitehurst
Paul S. Trible

North Carolina

Senate

Jesse A. Helms
Robert Morgan

- 160

LIST OF REVIEWERS (cont'd)

House

Walter Jones
L.H. Fountain

Executive Agencies

Department of Energy
Department of the Interior
Bureau of Land Management
Fish and Wildlife Service
Department of Transportation
Coast Guard

Independent Organizations

Marine Fisheries Advisory

Committee (MAFAC)
National Fisheries Institute
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries

Commission
National Food Processors Assoc.
Seafood Processors Association
Atlantic Offshore Fish and

Lobster Association
Maine Fisheries Inc.
New Bedford Fishermen's Union
New Bedford Seafood Processors'

Association
National Federation of Fishermen
National Fishermen
Maine Sardine Council
Meral Corporation
Agro Marine Industries, Inc.
Boston Fisheries Assoc, Inc.
Massachusetts Inshore

Draggermen
New England Steering Committee
Boat Owners United
Gloucester Fish Association
The Wildlife Society
Sierra Club

Conservation Law Foundation
Dickstein, Shapiro and Morin
Conservation Foundation

#